Unfortunately, as this is a very important proposal for Tezos, I tend to agree for the reasons I have stated in this thread.
Andreas: the escape hatch is no substitute for proper governance. It is a relatively complicated procedure that presents high barriers to entry. The proposal’s part to lower the threshold from 50% to 33% in a way acknowledges this. What voting system would approve changes based on a 1/3 minority voting in favour? It is also a red herring: between exchanges and the foundation, more than 1/3 of XTZ is in the hands of actors that respectively will not participate in governance (to their credit) and will not vote against liquidity baking. So the escape hatch 33% threshold still requires effectively more than half of bakers to activate it, which is inconceivable.
The truth is that we now have sufficient data to come to the honest conclusion that liquidity baking in its current implementation has been an abject failure. The idea is sound, and I’m sure we’ll get it at some point (I’m on team USDC, if and when it becomes available). But we should not be flippant about raising inflation by ~ 0.3 percentage points against no discernible benefit.
Lastly, I frankly haven’t liked the dismissive attitude of some leading voices of this community towards the legitimate concerns raised by liquidity baking and the choice of supported asset. Whether you are in favour of liquidity baking or not, all sides should be encouraged to share their views and we should welcome different points of view. An open and fair democratic process includes the ability of naysayers to formally express their disagreement simply and effectively. In this case, that means injecting two proposals: one including liquidity baking and one without it. I’m not even sure which I would like my baker to vote for in that case. But the option should be there. It will create a proper consensus in the community either way.
