# Improving POS and incentivising node operators

**URL:** https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/improving-pos-and-incentivising-node-operators/3878
**Category:** Research and Development
**Created:** [November 10, 2021, 11:21pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/improving-pos-and-incentivising-node-operators/3878 "2021-11-10T23:21:13Z")
**Posts on this page:** 1
**Page:** 1

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### Author: ![Ali](https://forum.tezosagora.org/user_avatar/forum.tezosagora.org/ali/32/1203_2.png) [@Ali](https://forum.tezosagora.org/u/Ali)
#### Post date: [November 10, 2021, 11:21pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/improving-pos-and-incentivising-node-operators/3878/1 "2021-11-10T23:21:13Z")

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Currently, in (D)POS and the current Baking system that Tezos conducts, voters delegate their votes to a specified ‘baker’. This creates an imbalance, with many bakers having a high % of votes.  
To gain a specific amount of votes, isn’t necessarily based upon how ‘good’ of an actor one is in the ecosystem - by taking part in governance and contribution. additionally, votes are sometimes earned through marketing, lowering fees to beat competition.

I propose a following model that will increase incentives and expect more ‘small-time’ node operators to spring out, who would just like to economically run a node and have a concrete say in governance.

A model where all delegation is put into a pool and this pool evenly spreads out votes across all nodes depending on the node operators collateral as a % of the entire collateral of all the nodes.  
What this does essentially is, make Node operators fight to lock in the most collateral, whilst at the same time, creating a level playing field to earn votes.  
Of course, this would have to entail a max cap % of the delegator taking rewards.