# Keeping Etherlink Secure: Ganesha 7.0–7.2 Security Disclosures

**URL:** https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/keeping-etherlink-secure-ganesha-7-0-7-2-security-disclosures/7184
**Category:** Research and Development
**Created:** [September 21, 2026, 1:17pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/keeping-etherlink-secure-ganesha-7-0-7-2-security-disclosures/7184 "2026-09-21T13:17:21Z")
**Posts on this page:** 1
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### Author: ![v32](https://forum.tezosagora.org/user_avatar/forum.tezosagora.org/v32/32/2416_2.png) [@v32](https://forum.tezosagora.org/u/v32)
#### Post date: [September 24, 2026, 8:47am UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/keeping-etherlink-secure-ganesha-7-0-7-2-security-disclosures/7184/2 "2026-09-24T08:47:01Z")

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> [@NomadicLabs](#):
>
> t remains possible to demonstrate when a sequencer is actively censoring a transaction by looking at the delayed inbox and seeing an item stuck there for more than a few minutes at most (most items are injected by Optimistic Labs in less than 30s). A misbehaving sequencer remains subjected to the Tezos L1 bakers, and should be voted out without a second thought.

does this mean that only certain classes of transactions are accepted in 30 seconds and others are held back for review? do you reorg, is there an allow list? like other custodial chains and stables when you have the ability to censor malicious transactions you _should_ and i don’t see how this is any different, but that is what this is. censorship. if someone could find a sequence of bits that is a valid transaction but gets censored by this i doubt it would be sufficient evidence for bakers to take action considering _none_ voted against putting a infinite money glitch on mainnet. that is not a comforting solution. you need guardrails for when governance fails, and it has.

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