# Tezos needs to become brave again

**URL:** <https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/tezos-needs-to-become-brave-again/7116>\
**Category:** Philosophy and Economics\
**Created:** [June 18, 2026, 2:17pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/tezos-needs-to-become-brave-again/7116 "2026-06-18T14:17:43Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 16

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**Author:** ![jevonearth](https://forum.tezosagora.org/user_avatar/forum.tezosagora.org/jevonearth/32/144_2.png) [@jevonearth](https://forum.tezosagora.org/u/jevonearth)\
**Post date:** [November 20, 2026, 7:13pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/tezos-needs-to-become-brave-again/7116/16 "2026-11-20T19:13:55Z")

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> [@murbard](#):
>
> Tezos core improvements are shipping: Tezos X, post-quantum, the regular protocol upgrades. That doesn’t mean there can’t be a focus on products.
> 
> We depart on the order of operations. “Fund the community well enough and great products will grow out of it” has been tried, for years and at scale. Tons of grant money went out, and very little of it turned into things people actually use. Hic et Nunc is the one clear success, and it came from a small hackathon grant. We still do hackathons by the way, see Shipyard.
> 
> To reiterate the point I made at TezDev: the strategy is to fund products that demonstrate real traction and revenue, not spraying and praying.

> [@Primate411](#):
>
> The way things appear, Trilitech works to empower itself, not necessarily support builders that are not affiliated with Trilitech.

Reading @murbard’s reply here alongside yesterday’s announcement in [`#7242`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/upcoming-changes-in-the-development-process-of-our-teams-working-on-software-for-the-tezos-l1-blockchain-and-etherlink/7242/7) that day-to-day Tezos L1 and Etherlink development on `gitlab.com/tezos/tezos` is moving to a private repository on December 2, it is worth looking directly at the public economic and corporate record of what the Tezos ecosystem has become since 2021.

### 1. Not a Functioning Ecosystem: A Vertically Integrated Monopsony

In a functioning blockchain ecosystem, independent companies build products and infrastructure funded by user fees, commercial customers, or competing capital sources. What exists on Tezos today is an economic **monopsony** : a market with a single dominant buyer of protocol, tooling, indexing, and wallet labor (the Tezos Foundation as capital allocator, paired with the consolidated Trilitech and Nomadic Labs corporate group as in-house supplier and technical reviewer).

In economic terms, it is structurally worse than a single-employer mining town, because a mining town at least exports physical ore to external buyers outside the town. Look at the actual on-chain fee activity outside Foundation patronage right now:

- **Tezos L1 transaction fees (`DefiLlama` / `TzKT`, 18 Nov 2026):**  **`$71 USD`** over 24 hours, and **`$10,954 USD`** over the trailing 30 days (`~$365/day`, or `~$133,000/year` annualized; daily burn value is down `>99%` in USD and `~95%` in native `XTZ` from the September 2021 peak).
- **Etherlink L2 fees (`Blockscout` / `DefiLlama`, 18 Nov 2026):** Roughly **`$29 USD per day`** (`~140 XTZ/day`) in L2 gas fees, while `98.6%` (`$15,063`) of Etherlink’s `$15,278` in 30-day application fees comes from a single institutional money-market issuer (`Spiko`) and `$205` (`~$6.83/day`) comes from `Uniswap V3`.
- **Off-chain Foundation disbursements (`2025 TF Biannual Activity Reports`, H1 + H2 `Financial Overview`):**  **`$89,055,091 USD`** paid out to grantees and service providers in calendar year 2025, excluding investments and loans (`~$244,000/day`, or **`~$10,166/hour`** ).

**The Tezos Foundation spends more endowment capital every 65 minutes (`~$11,013`) than the entire Tezos L1 blockchain generates in transaction fees in a full 30-day month (`$10,954`).**

In a patronage economy where off-chain Foundation payouts exceed annualized L1 + L2 chain fee revenue (`~$144K/year`) by more than **600 to 1** , external teams that still rely on Foundation grant renewals for payroll (`wallets`, `indexers`, `marketplaces`) have no alternative commercial market to fall back on. When the same house organization whose staff review external grant renewals simultaneously forks active upstream libraries (`Taquito`, `@ecadlabs/beacon-*`) into house replacements (`octez.js`, `octez.connect`) and publicly pitches migration away from upstream, no grant-dependent team can evaluate that choice in a neutral market free from funding-renewal risk. Contrast that with **Kukai Wallet** , which has received no Foundation development funding for years and continues to build on `@taquito/*` and `@ecadlabs/beacon-*` purely on engineering reliability and security responsiveness. (As anyone can verify in [`#7227`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/octez-js-v25-1-0-rc-0-taquito-parity-and-recoverable-evm-aliases-for-etherlink-8-0/7227), every feature and fix in `Octez.js v25.1.0-rc.0`, save for a single Etherlink alias helper, was copied straight from Taquito’s `main` branch after ECAD Labs was defunded, explicitly pitched _“so that Taquito users can move to Octez.js without losing features or fixes”_; and just today, `20 November 2026`, ECAD Labs shipped two more upstream security releases in [`Taquito v25.1.2`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/releases/tag/v25.1.2) and [`v25.1.3`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/releases/tag/v25.1.3) for [`GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/security/advisories/GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h) and [`GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/security/advisories/GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776) alongside [`Taquito v25.2.0-rc0` & `@ecadlabs/beacon-sdk v4.9.0-ecad-rc.0` in `#7244`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/call-for-testers-taquito-v25-2-0-rc0-ecadlabs-beacon-sdk-v4-9-0-ecad-rc-0-lifecycle-type-safety-overhaul-faster-pairing-no-more-half-open-stalls-7-locales-rtl-accessibility-and-tezos-x/7244).)

### 2. Central Management and Control: What the Public UK Filings Show

Starting in July 2024, the Tezos Foundation removed the table disclosing core-entity funding allocations (`Nomadic Labs`, `Trilitech`) from its Biannual Activity Reports, highlighting `$10.30M` in newly approved external grant initiatives at the front of its two 2025 reports (`$7.20M` H1 + `$3.10M` H2) while disclosing `$89.06M` in executed payouts on the final page (leaving **`$78.76M/year` unitemized** ). Similarly, Trilitech’s parent entity, **Digital Commonwealth Foundation (`DCF`)**, is incorporated in Jersey, where its financial statements are not publicly available.

The catch is that once **Trilitech Limited** (`UK Company No. 13532868`) outgrew UK statutory small-company/small-group thresholds on turnover and headcount, and because `DCF` does not publish consolidated accounts in Jersey (`Companies Act 2006, ss. 399 & 401`), Trilitech Limited became statutorily required to file full, independently audited Consolidated Financial Statements on the public UK registry. Anyone can download the PDF directly from UK Companies House and read the notes for themselves:

- **UK Companies House Filing History (`Trilitech Limited #13532868`):** [TRILITECH LIMITED filing history - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/13532868/filing-history) _(see “Full accounts made up to 31 December 2025”, signed 11 August 2026 and filed 17 August 2026)_

Here is what those audited statutory filings record on their face:

1. **100% Cash Acquisition of Nomadic Labs SAS (`Note 9` & `Note 15`):** On **30 June 2025** (more than 11 months _before_ @murbard told this forum on 10 June 2026 in [`#7093/19`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/signatory-remote-signer-end-of-ecad-labs-maintenance/7093/19), two months prior to the August 2026 publication of these accounts, that cutting independent teams is not _“self-serving for these entities who pull the strings”_ and that _“most of the cost cutting comes from reducing budgets to these entities”_), **Trilitech Limited acquired 100% of the issued share capital of Nomadic Labs SAS for `£18,519,205` in cash** (booking `£15,201,652` in goodwill), financed by allotting `18,519,205` `£1` shares to its Jersey parent, **Digital Commonwealth Foundation** (which Note 17 notes also controls undisclosed BVI undertakings and whose financial statements _“are not publicly available”_).
2. **Audited Group Revenue and Profit (`Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income`):** In FY 2025 (12 months of Trilitech plus 6 months of post-acquisition Nomadic Labs), the Trilitech group recorded **`£32,429,752` (`~$41M-$42.5M USD`)** in operating revenue (`£29.09M` turnover + `£3.34M` R&D credit; standalone Trilitech turnover was `£22.20M` vs. `£22.62M` in 2024, `-1.9%`), booked **`£2,202,839` (`~$2.8M-$2.9M USD`)** in net profit after tax, and closed 2025 with **`£4,937,632`** in accumulated retained earnings and `144` average staff.
3. **Overlapping Governance:** Trilitech Limited (now 100% owner of Nomadic Labs SAS) is governed by a three-person UK Board of Directors: **Arthur Breitman** (registered under his legal name `Arthur Robert Meunier`), **Katelyn Hegarty** (Chief of Staff), and **Lodewijk van Setten** (General Counsel), while Arthur simultaneously sits on the **Tezos Foundation Council** in Switzerland.

There is nothing unlawful about structuring a corporate group across Switzerland, Jersey, the UK, and France, or complying with formal conflict-of-interest procedures in each jurisdiction. Yet strip away that multi-jurisdictional legal sophistry and look at **central management and control** , and in my view the structural conflict is unmistakable: even assuming every formal Swiss Foundation recusal rule is observed to the letter when specific entity budgets are minuted, one individual sits simultaneously on the Swiss Foundation Council overseeing the endowment and ecosystem strategy and on the three-person UK Board of Directors of the consolidated contractor group (`Trilitech Limited`, now 100% owner of `Nomadic Labs SAS`) whose personnel review external grantees while building competing in-house forks. In our own renewal discussions with engineering leadership at Nomadic Labs, our counterparts were candid that they did not have final authority on terms and had to take proposals up to Arthur for sign-off. Bakers, builders, and token holders can read the Companies House filings and judge that governance structure for themselves.

### 3. The 2014 Vision vs. the 2021-2026 Record

In the 2014 Tezos _Position Paper_ and _White Paper_, Arthur (“L.M. Goodman”) warned against the capture of a blockchain by a single core development team and proposed an open market for protocol upgrades where competing proposals would win on merit and be compensated via attached on-chain protocol invoices.

Look at where that vision stands after more than 8 years on mainnet and 21 on-chain governance upgrades (through protocol `025 Ushuaia`):

- **Competing proposals (`0 for 21` on-chain governance upgrades):** Bakers have occasionally exercised veto power over specific features or parameters (such as rejecting Adaptive Issuance in `Oxford 1`), and Tez Capital attempted an independent parameter fork with `Qena` / `Qena42` in 2024 (which won the Proposal period before failing Exploration after Nomadic Labs opposed it in [`#6478`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/6478)). Across all 21 governance upgrades activated on mainnet (`004 Athens` through `025 Ushuaia`), however, zero proposals from outside the Foundation-funded core-contractor pipeline have ever passed.
- **Protocol invoices abandoned:** Only 6 protocol invoice payouts across 5 upgrades, totaling `28,700 XTZ` (`~$25,091` at activation prices), were ever executed on Tezos mainnet, and **zero** have been paid since `Lima` in December 2022 (`invoice_contract` in `init_storage.ml` has been commented out across the last 10 consecutive protocol directories, `016 Mumbai` through `025 Ushuaia`). Off-chain Foundation payouts in 2025 alone (`$89.06M`) were **3,549x** the cumulative USD value of every on-chain protocol invoice paid in Tezos history.
- **L1 protocol cadence winding down (despite the claim above of _“the regular protocol upgrades”_):** After `024 Tallinn` activated in January 2026 (followed by 6 empty epochs) and `025 Ushuaia` activated on 30 June 2026, Tezos went through **9 consecutive empty Proposal epochs** (`Epochs 91 to 99`) plus a failed 1-upvote vanity proposal in `Epoch 100` (`15 of the 17` completed governance epochs in 2026 had no proposals), with still no `026` upgrade proposed nearly five months after `Ushuaia`. That matches what has been communicated in `proto-ecosystem` calls and negotiations: L1 protocol changes are winding down toward minimal maintenance.

Arthur joined the Tezos Foundation Council on **24 February 2021** and incorporated Trilitech Limited on **27 July 2021**. While macro crypto conditions are routinely blamed for `XTZ`, Tezos has suffered a severe relative decline against peer networks across **every measurable benchmark** over that exact window:

| Metric | Feb / Jul 2021 Baseline | 17 Nov 2026 UTC Close | Relative Change |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **BTC Price** | `$49,705` (24 Feb '21) / `$39,407` (27 Jul '21) | **`$64,894`** | **`+30.6%` / `+64.7%`** |
| **ETH Price** | `$1,627` (24 Feb '21) / `$2,298` (27 Jul '21) | **`$1,823`** | **`+12.1%` / `-20.7%`** |
| **SOL Price** | `$17.30` (24 Feb '21) / `$28.07` (27 Jul '21) | **`$75.11`** | **`+334.1%` / `+167.6%`** |
| **XTZ Price** | `$3.53` (24 Feb '21) / `$2.86` (27 Jul '21) | **`$0.21`** | **`-94.0%` / `-92.6%`** |
| **XTZ / BTC Ratio** | `0.00007111 BTC` (Feb '21) / `0.00007265 BTC` (Jul '21) | **`0.00000327 BTC`** | **`-95.40%` / `-95.49%`** |
| **XTZ / ETH Ratio** | `0.002173 ETH` (Feb '21) / `0.001246 ETH` (Jul '21) | **`0.0001165 ETH`** | **`-94.64%` / `-90.64%`** |
| **XTZ / SOL Ratio** | `0.2043 SOL` (Feb '21) / `0.1020 SOL` (Jul '21) | **`0.002829 SOL`** | **`-98.62%` / `-97.23%`** |
| **Market Cap Rank** | **#10-#25** (`$2.5B-$2.7B`, 2020-Feb '21) | **#145** (`$228.5M`, CoinGecko) | Entire `XTZ` market cap (`$228.5M`) is **less than half of TF’s published `$530M` Dec 2025 treasury (`0.43x`, or `0.50x` of `$454M` non-XTZ assets)** |
| **DeFi TVL (`DefiLlama`)** | `$205.3M` L1 peak (Oct '21); `$83.3M` Etherlink peak (Nov '25 subsidies) | **`$18.26M` L1** (#56) + **`$6.67M` Etherlink** (#79) | **`-91.1%` L1 / `-92.0%` L2** ; annual TF spend (`$89.06M`) is **`3.57x`** combined L1+L2 TVL (`$24.93M`) |
| **Active L1 Bakers (`TzKT`)** | **380** (Feb '21) / **393** (Sep '21) | **192** (Cycle 1419) | **`~50%` loss** (`-49.5%` vs. Feb '21; `-51.1%` vs. Sep '21; `266 -> 192` in the past 12 months) |

Losing **95.4% against Bitcoin** , **94.6% against Ethereum** (`90.6%` since July 2021), and **98.6% against Solana** over a 5.7-year window in which Bitcoin rose `+30.6%` (`+64.7%` since Trilitech’s incorporation) and Solana rose `+334%` cannot be explained away as “macro conditions.”

### 4. Credit Where Due on the Art Scene, and Why the Trajectory Is Not Stated Plainly

As @Primate411 pointed out, the one movement that kept Tezos culturally vibrant over the past five years was the grassroots counter-culture art community sparked organically by **Hic et Nunc (`HEN`)** in March 2021 and sustained by independent builders and artists across `Teia`, `Objkt`, and `fxhash`. And to be fair to the Tezos Foundation and Trilitech, they employed dedicated arts leads, funded exhibitions at Art Basel and major museums, and put real grant support behind that community. It would be unfair not to credit that support.

Still, a grassroots digital art movement cannot by itself carry the infrastructure economics of a Layer 1 blockchain (`$71` in 24-hour L1 fees; `$365/day` 30-day average) when independent infrastructure companies across the rest of the stack have been steadily pushed out or replaced in-house.

When community members ask on this forum why leadership has not shared a transparent ecosystem roadmap, **in my view the issue is not the absence of a strategy; it is that the effective trajectory visible across these public filings, governance votes, and repository changes would be difficult to defend plainly to `XTZ` token holders:**

- Tezos L1 protocol development winding down toward minimal maintenance;
- Independent ecosystem companies giving way to a single consolidated corporate group (`Digital Commonwealth Foundation` → `Trilitech Limited` → `Nomadic Labs SAS`) backed by tens of millions of dollars a year in unitemized Foundation payouts;
- Public accountability surfaces (`Biannual Report` core-entity tables, `linear.app/tezos`, `proto-ecosystem` calls, Slack, and now day-to-day development on `gitlab.com/tezos/tezos` in [`#7242`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/upcoming-changes-in-the-development-process-of-our-teams-working-on-software-for-the-tezos-l1-blockchain-and-etherlink/7242/7)) closing one after another; and
- Strategic focus shifting toward commercial ventures generating corporate “traction and revenue” inside the house group (`£32.43M` operating revenue and `£2.20M` net profit after tax at Trilitech in 2025), while `XTZ` holders, bakers, and artists hold a token whose entire circulating market cap (`$228.5M`) now sits at less than half of the `$530M` Foundation treasury originally raised to build an open, decentralized Tezos ecosystem.

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_[View the full topic](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/tezos-needs-to-become-brave-again/7116)._
