# Upcoming changes in the development process of our teams working on software for the Tezos L1 blockchain and Etherlink

**URL:** <https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/upcoming-changes-in-the-development-process-of-our-teams-working-on-software-for-the-tezos-l1-blockchain-and-etherlink/7242>\
**Category:** Research and Development\
**Created:** [November 19, 2026, 4:59pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/upcoming-changes-in-the-development-process-of-our-teams-working-on-software-for-the-tezos-l1-blockchain-and-etherlink/7242 "2026-11-19T16:59:24Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 7

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**Author:** ![jevonearth](https://forum.tezosagora.org/user_avatar/forum.tezosagora.org/jevonearth/32/144_2.png) [@jevonearth](https://forum.tezosagora.org/u/jevonearth)\
**Post date:** [November 20, 2026, 7:01pm UTC](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/upcoming-changes-in-the-development-process-of-our-teams-working-on-software-for-the-tezos-l1-blockchain-and-etherlink/7242/7 "2026-11-20T19:01:03Z")

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Thank you @lthms (another individual engineer I have worked with over the years and admire) for stepping in to clarify the distinction between routine day-to-day review and withheld security upgrades. Even with that distinction drawn, the “AI / Vulnpocalypse” rationale in the announcement does not hold up to technical scrutiny. In my view, AI vulnerability discovery is a convenient pretext for the same steady withdrawal from public visibility and external accountability that has been underway across Tezos governance for the past two years.

### 1. Why the “Vulnpocalypse” Rationale Does Not Add Up Technically

The announcement states two things together:

> _“In addition, routine development can reveal sensitive information: a public branch fixing a seemingly harmless bug, or a discussion about the security of a future feature, can give an attacker a hint on a flaw in software already running on the network.”_  
> _“We will set up automated mirroring of the master branch, meaning that our changes will be made available as soon as they are approved and merged.”_

Look at both halves of that workflow together:

- **Zero-day scanning:** An AI agent (`Claude Code`, `Codex`, or a multi-agent pipeline) hunting for 0-days on live Tezos L1 or Etherlink nodes scans the deployed code and `master`, both of which remain completely public.
- **Known security fixes:** When engineers _do_ recognize that a bug or fix is security-sensitive, standard open-source security hygiene (used by the Linux kernel, Chromium, Rust, Go, Ethereum clients, and Cosmos after the August 2026 post-mortem cited above) is to develop that patch in a **private security advisory fork** and withhold publication until coordinated deployment (which, as @lthms noted above and as today’s Ganesha 7.3 post-mortem in [`#7243`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/keeping-etherlink-secure-ganesha-7-3-security-disclosures/7243) illustrates, is already how targeted security patches are handled).
- **“Seemingly harmless” routine bugfixes:** Conversely, if an engineer and reviewer do _not_ realize a routine fix touches a live vulnerability, under this new workflow they approve and merge it, and **automated mirroring immediately publishes that exact commit diff onto public `master`** weeks or months before node releases ship or L1 protocol upgrades activate. Automated patch-diffing of newly merged `master` commits is the exact AI attack vector described in the Google Threat Intelligence report cited in the OP.

You do not need to move **100% of routine day-to-day L1 protocol, node, RPC, and Etherlink engineering** behind closed doors to keep security advisories private, and auto-mirroring `master` means unrecognized bugfixes still land in public before deployment anyway.

Look at how open-source security handling actually works in practice today (`20 November 2026`): this morning we shipped two security releases in **Taquito [`v25.1.2`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/releases/tag/v25.1.2) and [`v25.1.3`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/releases/tag/v25.1.3)** (also rolled into **[`v25.2.0-rc0`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/call-for-testers-taquito-v25-2-0-rc0-ecadlabs-beacon-sdk-v4-9-0-ecad-rc-0-lifecycle-type-safety-overhaul-faster-pairing-no-more-half-open-stalls-7-locales-rtl-accessibility-and-tezos-x/7244)**): [`GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/security/advisories/GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h) in `@taquito/local-forging` (reported directly to `security@ecadlabs.com` by `@byfor8`) and [`GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776`](https://github.com/ecadlabs/taquito/security/advisories/GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776) in `@taquito/sapling` (reported by Rahul Saxena of Bluethroat Labs and forwarded to us by `security@tezos.com` today). Once we received the `@taquito/sapling` report this morning, we opened tested fixes within an hour and published `v25.1.3` to npm in ~2.5 hours (verified by the reporter against his Octez 25.3 replay harness), all while keeping day-to-day Taquito and Beacon engineering 100% open on GitHub.

### 2. What Moving `tezos/tezos` Private Actually Locks Out

In Post `#3`, @lthms wrote: _“For ‘regular’ upgrades, I want to challenge the idea that MRs on Gitlab have, up until now, been used as a coordination mechanism with bakers.”_

Bakers pressing a vote button on a finished proposal (as @Primate411 noted in Post `#6`) are not the only external participants in an open-source blockchain:

1. **Independent SDKs, wallets, remote signers, and indexers lose advance visibility:** Having maintained **Taquito** (and previously **Signatory** ) across all 21 on-chain Tezos protocol upgrades since `Athens` in 2019, watching in-flight MRs and technical discussions on `gitlab.com/tezos/tezos` is specifically how external infrastructure teams catch breaking RPC schemas, binary-encoding shifts, and gas/storage parameter changes _before_ they land as a _fait accompli_ on `master`. That early visibility became our last remaining coordination surface after our team was dropped from `proto-ecosystem` calls and disconnected from the shared Slack-Connect channels on September 4.
2. **It forecloses the original 2014 promise of open protocol governance:** The announcement states: _“We are committed to improving our documentation and tooling so that anyone can participate fully in Tezos ecosystem governance, including reviewing our changes and submitting protocol proposals.”_ In the 2014 Tezos _Position Paper_ and _White Paper_, self-amendment was designed so Tezos would never be captured by a single closed core development team, allowing independent teams to compete on protocol proposals and earn on-chain invoices on merit. Across more than 8 years on mainnet and all 21 on-chain governance upgrades (through `025 Ushuaia`), zero proposals from outside the Foundation-funded core-contractor pipeline have ever passed, and zero protocol invoices have been paid since `Lima` in December 2022. How is any external team supposed to collaborate on or propose protocol changes when the active development tree, code review, and design discussions live on a private GitLab server accessible only to Trilitech, Nomadic Labs, and Functori?

### 3. Not About AI: A Consistent Retreat from Public Accountability

If this change were really about AI agents, it would not fit so neatly into a pattern that began long before any “Vulnpocalypse” report. Every other surface through which token holders, bakers, and independent builders could evaluate core execution and spending was already closed using other justifications:

1. **Public issue tracking and roadmaps went private (`Asana` → `Linear`):** Backlog triage, roadmaps, and sprint prioritization moved off public GitLab/GitHub trackers into Asana and then into a private `linear.app/tezos` workspace.
2. **Core-entity financial transparency was removed from the Activity Reports (July 2024):** The Tezos Foundation removed the table disclosing funding allocations to core development entities (`Nomadic Labs`, `Trilitech`), highlighting `$10.30M` in newly approved external grant initiatives at the front of the two 2025 reports while disclosing `$89.06M` in actual payouts to grantees and service providers on the back page without itemizing where the other `$78.76M` goes.
3. **Independent infrastructure teams were consolidated out of the ecosystem:** Over the past few years, independent maintainer organizations (`Cryptonomic`, `Blockwatch`, `AirGap`, and now `ECAD Labs`, among others) saw their Tezos roles wound down, absorbed in-house, or defunded; critical baker infrastructure like `Signatory` had its maintenance funding cut ([`#7093`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/7093)); and actively maintained open-source SDKs (`Taquito` and `Beacon`) were forked under `trilitech/*` as `octez.js` and `octez.connect`.
4. **Cross-team coordination channels closed:** Independent maintainers were removed from `proto-ecosystem` calls and shared Slack channels.
5. **And now (`December 2, 2026`), day-to-day development on `gitlab.com/tezos/tezos` goes private:** External builders, wallets, indexers, bakers, and token holders are left with post-merge code drops on `master`.

None of steps 1 through 4 had anything to do with AI vulnerability scanners. What they all share is the governance preference @murbard stated candidly on this forum in [`#7093/13`](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/signatory-remote-signer-end-of-ecad-labs-maintenance/7093/13) back in June:

> _“Do teams at TT or NL sometimes not do a good job, waste resources, not deliver. Of course. But when they do, teams can be reorganized and we don’t have to deal with online disparagement campaigns…”_

When day-to-day branches, MRs, review timelines, and design debates on `gitlab.com/tezos/tezos` are moved onto a private corporate server, nobody outside the house group can see stalled work, false starts, wasted resources, or breaking changes in real time; the public only sees what is curated onto `master` after the fact.

With day-to-day git development, issue backlogs, coordination calls, and core-entity budget breakdowns all moved behind closed doors, `forum.tezosagora.org` is now the last surviving public accountability surface in Tezos governance. Which legal entity currently owns and operates `tezosagora.org`, and will leadership commit on the public record to keeping this forum open, indexed, and **unpruned**?

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