Instead of relying on an inflationary tax, the contributions to fund proposals and projects could be completely voluntary. Let’s say we make a treasury in the main protocol layer of tezos, funded exclusively by voluntary contributions. The bakers will be the ones who will invest the most in the future of the chain because they are already heavily invested anyway, if a baker is not donating part of his delegation’s profits, then the delegators will simply stop delegating him, effectively boycotting the irrational bakers, which contribute nothing or contribute very little to fund rational things like awesome tech upgrades like tenderbake etc.
But let’s say a baker doesn’t want to fund LB because he considers his funding to be irrational and stops providing the funding, rational delegates who also consider LB to be irrational might still stay with him because they agree that LB is bad. And that way we let the market decide.
I mean, we have the perfect scoring system which is the baker’s delegation capacity, which is basically the baker’s approval rate, and we are not using it for a voluntary contribution protocol treasury model despite the fact that is already built-in Tezos. The problem of free riders would be greatly mitigated by delegations boycotts.
This model is much better than taxing through inflation. Much, much better.
Also, more bakers will want to contribute to get more delegators, which is the selfish aspect that will make this system viable.