You should look at rewards in real terms, that is the nominal rewards minus the issuance. It’s difficult to say whether any individual baker (or delegator)'s real returns from adaptive issuance as proposed here would increase or decrease, since it depends on the amount of Tez baked, and this is not knowable in advance. What is clear is that rewards from bakers would increase relatively to those of delegators, as compared to the situation today (point 1 of the proposal as per Arthur’s original post in this thread). Therefore, all users currently delegating will have a stronger incentive to start baking instead. You do raise two good points in my view:
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any entity running a private bakery can stake enough to decrease inflation, forcing other bakeries to shut. In the ETH research around adaptive issuance, this is called “griefing” or discouragement attacks and I’ve linked to a paper discussing it in one of my previous posts in this thread (#32). Basically, I believe we should have some solid foundations supporting the specific issuance curve, and if we don’t we should perhaps just copy the ETH model (or at least have clear justifications for deviating from it).
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Delegators also play a role in governance. I agree there is a governance aspect to this proposal and I’ve also raised that point previously, however it does not seem to get much traction. Perhaps this proposal should be accompanied by some change in voting behaviour; perhaps it should e.g. be more easily possible for delegators (or simply holders of Tez) to vote directly on proposals, bypassing bakers.