Hey. Isn’t anyone worried/bothered by the the new 66% liveness thing?
It seems like 34% of supply to stop the chain looks too low for me
How would that work? The moment less than 66% is endorsing in a block, the chain stops progressing? Can new bakers get in play at that point? And stake won’t be able to be moved from exchanges to other bakers either.
In todays Tezos Commons space they raised the 2/3 of consensus concern regarding to how the chain could stop if some of the big holders went offline for whatever reason
@nicolasochem mentioned a really good solution that.
When and if the chain stops it is going through the rounds of searchimg endorsements, there could be a parameter that after x rounds, if a baker is offline, they get slashed and removed from the calculation so the “pool” gets smaller till the 66.6% is met so the chain can move forward.
I feel like that is something we should really consider to add in next upgrades.
This is Ethereum’s “quadratic inactivity leak” described here
I would love to hear opinions from others about this approach. Maybe I am missing something. But if not a discussion should happen how to prevent a possible chain stop. I believe censorship resistance is a vital point and with the 2/3 consensus possibly endangered.
If the chain goes down there could be a protocol proposal to fix the issue, as it is now, we are relying on the trust that the bakers ( > 66%) in the space have the networks best interest in mind. If we can’t trust the validators of the network then Tezos is doomed to fail anyways IMO. Great question, I hope this answer helps you.
Wrong. When the chain stops and goes down its not possible to make a proposal. I see two options. The chain is stopped as long as enough bakers ( > 66%) are “online again”. This could be some hours, days, weeks…
Or the worse case is a hardfork needs to happen in my understanding. I am not sure if I like the chain split scenario. But I dont know a solution to this. Maybe lowering the 66.6%?
What would happen if we took a two step approach, and slashed non-performing bakers until we reached 66.6% (@nicolasochem proposal), while also saving their slashed stake in trust for reallocation to any new bakers that join the network during this period.
The more non-performing bakers who get slashed, the greater the incentive for new bakers to join and replace those recently slashed bakers.
We would probably need to set some parameters around how long these new bakers must remain active before receiving a payout from the “slashed bakers funds we stored in trust”.