Currently, protocol proposals on Tezos are identified solely by their cryptographic hash (e.g., PtTallin...). This creates a cognitive load for bakers and community members. I suggest introducing an optional Alias field (simple UTF-8 string) to the protocol proposal signature to provide immediate human readability.
The Problem
- Bakers’ Risk: It is easy to misidentify hashes during the Proposal periods. Identical prefixes can lead to voting errors.
- Vanity Hashing Overhead: Teams often spend significant computational resources “vanity mining” a protocol hash just to make it somewhat recognizable. This is an unnecessary barrier to entry.
- Auditability: Reviewing historical governance data currently requires looking up external databases to find the “community name” for a past hash.
Proposed Solution: Proposal Aliasing
Instead of teams trying to hash a protocol with a vanity prefix to produce a meaningful name, we could introduce a simple Alias/Metadata string field at the protocol level.
Key Mechanics:
- Simple String Field: An optional UTF-8 string submitted during the
proposeoperation. - On-Chain Uniqueness: The governance protocol will enforce that only one alias of its kind can exist in the voting system at any given time.
- Similarity Protection (Levenshtein Distance): To prevent “impersonation” or “typo-squatting” (e.g., proposing
Tallinn_v2vsTallinn_vZ), the protocol should enforce a minimum Levenshtein distance between active proposal aliases.- Logic: If a proposed alias is too mathematically similar to an existing one, the operation is rejected.
Pros & Cons
Pros
- UX Clarity: Bakers see “TeamX_Scaling_Fix” instead of a raw hash in their logs and dashboards.
- Resource Efficiency: Removes the need for vanity hashing, allowing teams to focus on code rather than mining a recognizable hash.
- Error Reduction: Drastically reduces the chance of a baker voting for the wrong proposal due to visual similarity.
Cons
- Signature Change: Requires an update to the
proposefunction signature. - Gas Overhead: Implementing Levenshtein distance checks on-chain adds a small gas cost to proposal submissions.
- State Growth: Adds a minor amount of extra data to the governance state.
Addressing Concerns: Security and Trust
It is important to acknowledge that this is not a “perfect” system. Bad actors could still inject misleading aliases to try and confuse others. However:
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Status Quo: This is no different from the current situation. Even now, a malicious actor can inject a vanity-prefixed proposal that contains junk code. No need for hashing.
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Bakers’ Responsibility: The ultimate gatekeepers are the Bakers. This proposal doesn’t create new vulnerabilities; it simply provides a more accessible label for the human beings making the decisions. The social layer of Tezos already filters for “official” vs “malicious” proposals; this just makes that filter easier to read.