Security Advisory: Beacon SDK / octez.connect Pairing & Session Vulnerabilities (Fixed in Taquito v25.1.1), and the Cost of Neglected Forks

1. Executive Summary & Upgrade Instructions

On November 9, 2026, ECAD Labs published @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.8.5-ecad and Taquito v25.1.1 (followed by @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.9.0-ecad-beta.2 and Taquito v25.2.0-beta1 on our prerelease tracks) to remediate a set of protocol and session-validation vulnerabilities affecting the Beacon SDK lineage, including:

  • @ecadlabs/beacon-*: < 4.8.5-ecad (Fixed in 4.8.5-ecad, GHSA-mv5x-v682-497f)
  • @taquito/beacon-wallet: <= 25.1.0 and 25.2.0-beta0 (Fixed in 25.1.1 and 25.2.0-beta1, GHSA-vh7x-6qwm-p785)
  • @tezos-x/octez.connect-* (trilitech/octez.connect): <= 5.0.4 and all 4.8.x releases (<= 4.8.6) (5.0.5 published on November 13, 2026 via port of ECAD Labs #116; 4.8.x remains unpatched)
  • @tezos-x/octez.js-dapp-wallet (trilitech/octez.js): 25.0.0 and 25.1.0-rc.0, which pin @tezos-x/octez.connect-dapp@5.0.4 (25.0.1 merged in trilitech/octez.js#171 on November 13, 2026 to bump to 5.0.5; 25.1.0-rc.0 remains on 5.0.4 as of embargo expiration)
  • @airgap/beacon-* (airgap-it/beacon-sdk): <= 4.8.1 (Unpatched; migrate to @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.8.5-ecad)

To give major Tezos wallets and dApps time to upgrade before opportunistic attackers noticed the fixes, we shipped v4.8.5-ecad and v25.1.1 on November 9 with understated commit messages and release notes, privately notified major ecosystem teams (including Kukai, MadFish/Temple, Objkt, Baking Bad, Tezos Domains, and Teia), and sent a formal coordinated security disclosure to Tezos Foundation Security (security@tezos.com), Nomadic Labs, and Trilitech under a 3-working-day embargo (extended by 24 hours to Friday, November 13, 2026 at 17:00 UTC).

Immediate Action for dApp and Wallet Maintainers

  1. Taquito v25 users: Upgrade @taquito/beacon-wallet and companion @taquito/* packages to 25.1.1:

    npm install @taquito/taquito@25.1.1 @taquito/beacon-wallet@25.1.1
    
  2. Direct Beacon SDK users or older Taquito versions (<= 24.x): Pin or override @ecadlabs/beacon-* (and any transitive @airgap/beacon-* packages) to 4.8.5-ecad.

  3. Post-upgrade storage hygiene: Because peers injected prior to upgrading persist in browser storage, dApps or users that suspect prior compromise should clear stored Beacon state (localStorage keys prefixed with beacon:) and re-pair.


2. Why This Vulnerability Came to ECAD Labs Instead of trilitech/octez.connect

These vulnerabilities were discovered, reproduced against a local Matrix Synapse and Playwright harness, and initially patched by independent open-source contributor David Kaminski (@dvkam), who has no known affiliation with ECAD Labs, Nomadic Labs, Trilitech, or Functori.

In a healthy ecosystem, an independent security researcher discovering a flaw in @tezos-x/octez.connect would report it to the funded maintainers of trilitech/octez.connect. Instead, David brought his report, reproduction harness, and patches to ECAD Labs.

The reason is straightforward, and it reflects a troubling pattern in how core Tezos developer infrastructure has been handled this year: defund the independent maintainer, fork and rebrand the repositories, fail to actively maintain the forks, and rely on unaffiliated contributors and the unfunded upstream maintainers to handle critical security engineering, QA, and ecosystem response.

  1. The February octez.connect Cutover: On February 20, 2026, after ECAD Labs’ Tezos Foundation grant ended, Nomadic Labs announced octez.connect on Tezos Agora (#6997) as the official successor to the Beacon SDK, declared to be “Maintained by Nomadic Labs, Trilitech and Functori.” That rollout was accompanied by an uncoordinated relay cutover that locked up roughly a third of active wallet sessions across the ecosystem and forced ECAD Labs to stand up @ecadlabs/beacon-* on an emergency basis just to keep Taquito dApps working. Five days later (February 25, 2026), we also had to privately disclose to Trilitech that all eight beacon-node-{1-8}.octez.io production Matrix relays were running an unpatched December 2023 build of Synapse (v1.98.0) affected by five published CVEs, including CVE-2025-30355 (exploited in the wild) and critical CVE-2024-53863 (CVSS 9.1).
  2. Eight Months of Neglected Maintenance on trilitech/octez.connect: My intention in standing up @ecadlabs/beacon-* was always temporary: keep Taquito users safe until the funded teams who claimed ownership of octez.connect stabilized their fork. Instead, as I documented on Tezos Agora on October 24 (#7217):
    • From April 24 through at least September 4, the private vulnerability reporting link advertised in trilitech/octez.connect’s SECURITY.md returned a 404 because private vulnerability reporting was never enabled on the repository (Issue #57).
    • @tezos-x/octez.connect 5.0.4 (published September 2) could not even cleanly disconnect and reconnect a wallet in a single browser session.
    • Independent contributor @dvkam had to diagnose the broken PostMessageClient ESM listener lifecycle himself (Issue #62), submit the fix (PR #63, which still sits unreviewed and unmerged today), and mark the Taquito migration PR (ecadlabs/taquito#3481) [BLOCKED].
    • When I asked the developer who authored every 5.0.x release for an update on October 20, he replied: “Please get in touch with Vincent poulian [sic]. I have moved on.”
  3. The Same Pattern on trilitech/octez.js: As documented on Agora #7211, after assuring us in February that trilitech/octez.js was merely a contingency plan and cutting us off from ecosystem Slack-Connect channels and the proto-ecosystem calls over the summer, Nomadic Labs and Trilitech stood up an automated commit-harvesting pipeline (Taquito Sync Tracker #53) and a check:rebrand linter to strip taquito and ecadlabs strings while harvesting the commits I write for Taquito in my spare time. Bugs discovered while testing @tezos-x/octez.js on Tezos X Previewnet were cross-filed onto ecadlabs/taquito with @tezos-x/octez.js imports swapped to @taquito/* so we would fix them upstream for free, and then backported into octez.js hours after we released.
  4. How This Security Response Played Out:
    • Because trilitech/octez.connect had left issues #57, #58, #59, #62, and PR #63 unanswered for weeks and had no working track record of responsive maintenance, @dvkam brought his security findings and patches to ECAD Labs on November 2.
    • Over the following week, working unfunded and in our own time alongside @dvkam, we ran multiple rounds of adversarial code review, fixed subtle reload and multi-wallet session-restoration edge cases, validated the fixes against our cross-version Matrix, WalletConnect, and Temple extension conformance suite, shipped @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.8.5-ecad and Taquito v25.1.1 on November 9, and coordinated directly with ecosystem wallet and dApp teams so they could upgrade before public disclosure.
    • We sent the full technical disclosure to security@tezos.com, Nomadic Labs, and Trilitech on November 9 (and extended the embargo by 24 hours to November 13 at 17:00 UTC after re-sending a corrected PDF attachment on November 10).
    • Throughout the entire embargo window, we received zero direct communication from any of the named octez.connect or Nomadic Labs engineering contacts. The only replies came from security@tezos.com, which initially sent bug-bounty boilerplate and then, on November 12, asked us not to publish our advisory when the embargo expired, calling our insistence on a standard disclosure timeline “a little hostile.”
    • Today (November 13, ahead of the 17:00 UTC embargo), trilitech/octez.connect merged a port of our ecadlabs/beacon-sdk-taquito-patches#116 commits (d1a927bf, referencing GHSA-58pq-q667-h23x), published @tezos-x/octez.connect-*@5.0.5 to npm, and merged a 25.0.1 dependency bump in trilitech/octez.js#171 (while 25.1.0-rc.0 and the @tezos-x/octez.connect-* 4.8.x line remain on unpatched versions as of publication time).

Forking open-source software is a right guaranteed by open-source licenses. However, forking critical ecosystem security infrastructure, rebranding it as the official path forward, neglecting its maintenance, and relying on an unaffiliated contributor and the defunded upstream maintainer to handle vulnerability research, hardening, QA, and ecosystem response is not sustainable stewardship. The Tezos ecosystem deserves better engineering accountability than that.


3. Technical Summary of the Vulnerabilities

Confirmed Root Causes

  1. Unsolicited Pairing Response Acceptance / Rogue Peer Injection (P2PCommunicationClient & PostMessageClient)

    • In both P2PCommunicationClient.listenForChannelOpening (Matrix @channel-open messages) and PostMessageClient.listenForChannelOpening (sealed extension pairing payloads), the SDK decrypted incoming sealed boxes and immediately registered and persisted the sender as a trusted peer via addPeer without verifying whether the pairing response id corresponded to a live pairing request issued by the dApp.
    • Because a sealed box only requires the recipient’s public key, successful decryption does not authenticate the sender.
    • With default browser storage, a dApp instance’s 32-byte communication public key is derived from a seed stored under beacon:sdk-secret-seed in localStorage and persists across reloads. Any party that learns a dApp instance’s public key (from a previously paired wallet, an older or glimpsed QR code, or a Matrix relay server) could send a crafted @channel-open payload at any time while the Matrix transport was running, even when no pairing modal was open, and inject an unauthorized wallet peer.
  2. Unvalidated Matrix Room Invites & Pre-Authentication Routing Poisoning (P2PCommunicationClient)

    • P2PCommunicationClient automatically joined any Matrix room it was invited to without verifying whether a pairing request was currently pending or whether the inviter matched an already-authenticated peer (@<hex(blake2b(peer.publicKey))>:<relay-domain>).
    • Furthermore, listenForChannelOpening and listenForEncryptedMessage wrote room routing associations (MATRIX_PEER_ROOM_IDS in localStorage) and updated the peer’s relay server before authenticating the sender or payload, allowing an unauthenticated Matrix user to overwrite outbound room routing for a legitimate paired wallet.
  3. Missing senderId Binding & Unauthenticated Session-Control Messages (DAppClient, P2PCommunicationClient, PostMessageClient)

    • P2PCommunicationClient.isSender checked event.sender.startsWith('@' + hexHash) without requiring the trailing : delimiter before the Matrix homeserver domain.
    • Decrypted messages in both Matrix and PostMessage clients trusted the inner JSON message.senderId field without verifying that message.senderId === await getSenderId(senderPublicKey), allowing a sender authenticated under one key to claim the senderId of another stored peer.
    • In DAppClient.handleResponse, BeaconMessageType.ChangeAccountRequest lacked authorization against the currently active peer (activePeer.publicKey, activePeer.senderId, and transport Origin), BeaconMessageType.Disconnect lacked binding to the authenticated peer whose saved records it removes, and ChangeAccountRequest accepted non-abstracted account payloads without verifying that getAddressFromPublicKey(account.publicKey) === account.address.

Scope & Plausible Downstream Scenarios

This issue is primarily dApp-side (the Matrix invite and routing issues also apply to wallets built on the Beacon wallet SDK, where they can misroute outbound messages). It does not expose wallet private keys or allow an attacker to forge cryptographic signatures from a user’s wallet (such as Kukai, Temple, or Umami).

If an attacker learns a target dApp instance’s persistent communication public key, the ability to remotely inject a peer and trigger unauthenticated ChangeAccountRequest or Disconnect events enables:

  1. Cross-Chain Bridge or Multi-Wallet Destination Swap: In a UI that connects a source-chain wallet (such as MetaMask on Etherlink) alongside a destination Tezos L1 wallet via Beacon and populates the Tezos recipient address from the active Beacon account, an unauthenticated ChangeAccountRequest over Matrix can swap the active Tezos address (tz1...) to an attacker-controlled address before the user signs the source-chain transaction.
  2. Session Hijacking During or After Pairing: Pre-empting or racing a pairing flow so the dApp binds to an unauthorized wallet peer and routes subsequent requestSignPayload or requestOperation requests to that peer.
  3. Remote Session Disruption: Remotely disconnecting a user’s active dApp session (Disconnect) or poisoning MATRIX_PEER_ROOM_IDS on demand.

4. What Was Fixed in @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.8.5-ecad and Taquito v25.1.1

  • In-Memory Pending Pairing Registry (PendingPairingRequests): Tracks locally issued pairing request IDs (up to 32 entries, 30-minute TTL, single-use accept/consume) and rejects unsolicited Matrix @channel-open and PostMessage pairing responses. Because browser storage cannot guarantee atomic single-use consumption across tabs, pending pairing IDs are kept in memory; reloading a page mid-handshake requires scanning a fresh QR code, while already-paired sessions restore normally.
  • Matrix Invite & Routing Hardening: Restricts Matrix room auto-join to active pairing windows or already-stored peers, enforces the @<hash>: delimiter in isSender, and delays MATRIX_PEER_ROOM_IDS and relay-server cache writes until after cryptographic and peer/pairing validation succeeds.
  • Authenticated Session Control (ChangeAccountRequest & Disconnect): Verifies message.senderId === await getSenderId(senderPublicKey) on decrypted messages, binds PostMessage messages to the paired extensionId, restricts ChangeAccountRequest to the active peer (publicKey, senderId, and Origin) while verifying getAddressFromPublicKey(account.publicKey) === account.address, and scopes Disconnect so a paired inactive peer can only remove its own records while only the active peer can terminate the active session.
  • Reload Restoration Ordering: Restores _activePeer before connecting transport listeners during DAppClient initialization so legitimate buffered Disconnect or ChangeAccountRequest events arriving on page reload are not dropped.

5. What’s Next: Call for Ecosystem Testers (@ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.9.0-ecad-beta.3 & Taquito v25.2.0-beta2)

While v4.8.5-ecad and Taquito v25.1.1 were kept strictly surgical so every production dApp and wallet could deploy the security fix with zero regression risk, David Kaminski (@dvkam) and ECAD Labs have also been doing deep architectural and reliability work on the next feature releases: @ecadlabs/beacon-* 4.9.0-ecad and Taquito v25.2.0.

We are currently wrapping up feedback from integrating 4.9.0-ecad-beta.2 and 25.2.0-beta1 into Kukai and our test dApp, and will soon publish @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.9.0-ecad-beta.3 and Taquito v25.2.0-beta2.

Highlights in @ecadlabs/beacon-* 4.9.0-ecad:

  • Matrix Session Lifecycle & Transport Reliability: Incorporates @dvkam’s session-epoch lifecycle work (retiring stale callbacks and storage writes cleanly across disconnects/reconnects) alongside Matrix M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN re-authentication recovery, AbortController request-cancellation fixes, Matrix room v11/v12 create-event support, per-room retained message caps (100 messages), and automatic eviction of retired .papers.tech relay nodes from localStorage.
  • dApp Observability & Typed Errors: Exposes connection and transport status, getPendingRequests(), subscribeToMessages(), getWalletInfo(), and typed BeaconError subclasses on DAppClient (and re-exported through @taquito/beacon-wallet), giving dApps full visibility into pending handshakes, late responses, and message disposition instead of silent hangs.
  • First-Class Wallet SDK (@ecadlabs/beacon-wallet): Adds built-in WalletWalletConnectTransport (multi-transport Matrix + WalletConnect orchestration on WalletClient), typed request-correlated response builders (respondPermission, respondOperation, respondSignPayload, respondError), cross-tab storage synchronization (subscribeToPeers, subscribeToPermissions, subscribeToDisconnect), and V3 envelope validation.
  • UI & Security Hygiene: Deprecates the shared built-in default WalletConnect projectId in favor of dApp-owned projectId registration, allows disabling built-in toasts while keeping the pairing modal, fixes mobile viewport overflow and toast timer races, and tolerates retired testnet network types in persisted storage.

Highlights in Taquito v25.2.0:

  • First-Class @ecadlabs/beacon-* 4.9.0-ecad Integration: Exposes the new Beacon observability APIs and expanded SDK types directly on @taquito/beacon-wallet.
  • TZIP-16 Metadata & View Hardening: Verified IPFS gateway fallback (#3506, #3510), always-populated MetadataEnvelope sha256Hash and integrityCheckResult, and immutable cached Michelson view code (#3522).
  • Browser ESM & Michelson Fixes: Removes unguarded global Buffer usage and legacy polyfills in browser code paths (#3512), fixes PairToken and ParameterSchema.hasAnnotation schema unwrapping (#3518), improves RPC ACL error messages on big-map value endpoints (#3523), and updates core cryptographic dependencies (@noble/curves, @noble/hashes, @scure/bip39, @stablelib/nacl, bs58check).

How You Can Help Test

Real-world wallet and dApp interoperability only stays solid when tested across diverse application stacks. Once @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.9.0-ecad-beta.3 and Taquito v25.2.0-beta2 are tagged (or starting today with 4.9.0-ecad-beta.2 and 25.2.0-beta1 on the beta / next dist-tags), we invite dApp and wallet teams across the ecosystem to pull them into staging environments and test:

  • Pairing, reload restoration, account switching, and disconnect flows across Kukai (web and iOS), Temple (extension and mobile), and Umami.
  • Multi-tab session behavior and the new DAppClient / BeaconWallet observability hooks.
  • Any issues or edge cases on ecadlabs/taquito or ecadlabs/beacon-sdk-taquito-patches.

6. Disclosure Timeline

Date (UTC) Event
Nov 2, 2026 Independent contributor David Kaminski (@dvkam) privately reports the pairing and session-control vulnerabilities to ECAD Labs, including a local Synapse + Playwright reproduction harness and initial patches (0001-security.patch and 0002-reliability.patch).
Nov 2 - Nov 9, 2026 ECAD Labs and @dvkam conduct multi-round adversarial review, harden reload and multi-wallet edge cases, and validate the fixes against the cross-version Matrix, WalletConnect, and Temple extension conformance suite (tests/beacon-matrix).
Nov 9, 2026 ECAD Labs publishes @ecadlabs/beacon-*@4.8.5-ecad (#116) and @taquito/*@25.1.1 (#3513) with neutral commit messages and release notes, begins private outreach to major Tezos wallets and dApps (Kukai, Temple/MadFish, Objkt, Baking Bad, Tezos Domains, Teia), and sends formal disclosure to security@tezos.com, Nomadic Labs, and Trilitech.
Nov 10, 2026 (13:05 UTC) Following an attachment check from security@tezos.com, ECAD Labs sends the corrected disclosure PDF (beacon-cve-disclosure-Nov9-2026.pdf).
Nov 12, 2026 (15:14 UTC) With no response from the named octez.connect contacts, ECAD Labs proactively extends the embargo by 24 hours to Friday, November 13, 2026 at 17:00 UTC to provide three full working days from receipt of the corrected PDF. security@tezos.com replies asking ECAD Labs not to disclose when the embargo expires; ECAD Labs confirms the Friday 17:00 UTC deadline stands.
Nov 13, 2026 (15:34 UTC) trilitech/octez.connect merges a port of ecadlabs/beacon-sdk-taquito-patches#116 (d1a927bf, referencing GHSA-58pq-q667-h23x) onto master and publishes @tezos-x/octez.connect-*@5.0.5 to npm.
Nov 13, 2026 (17:00 UTC) Embargo expires. Publication of GitHub Security Advisories on ecadlabs/beacon-sdk-taquito-patches (GHSA-mv5x-v682-497f) and ecadlabs/taquito (GHSA-vh7x-6qwm-p785) and release of this public disclosure.
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