Now that stakers are both frozen and slashable, it makes sense to allow stakers to override their baker’s vote or vote for their portion of the consensus locked stake, if their baker does not vote.
Further, stakers should be able to vote on Etherlink proposals and anything else that’s governed by our on-chain system.
This ability of stakers to vote may be another benefit, side from the 2X rewards, that pushes individuals to stake in greater numbers.
Seconded! 
Seems appropriate.
That may increase the number of transactions on-chain.
Not sure to be honest.
My view is that it is difficult to make Bakers to vote and they are only ~400.
Probably you are suggesting that they can have the option to vote separately if they want to(Override), that would be a good idea. But I think most people would delegate that to their bakers and that’s it.
As a baker myself (biased), i don’t agree
Delegators and stakers should always keep an eye on what their baker is doing. Not only for payouts, but also in governance.
If the baker has voted against their view, they can always switch to one that aligns more with them.
Yes, that would be too late, but that is due to the lack of research on their part.
Perhaps a review time would be more appropriate, where stakers and delegators have time to change bakeries before the vote gets registered?
Yes! I support this!
I used to be of the same mindset in the past. But it’s a benefit to be able to have a difference of opinion with a staker while still not parting ways because they trust your performance as a baker.
It’s also a big bonus not having to unstake, temporarily turn into a delegator and stake again, incurring at least 2-3 taxable events along the way.
I believe we can achieve the best of both worlds. Allow stakers to vote, but provide an option to set ‘I trust my baker with the vote’ as the default setting. This way, we ensure a smooth transition, and each staker can choose what works best for them.
The proposal is an override option, so there’s even no need for such a feature, Val: if the staker votes, he votes. If he doesn’t, the baker’s vote is counted instead. So abstaining is sufficient for the staker to delegate his vote to the baker. In this case, abstention only happens if both the staker and the baker abstain.
Anyway, this proposal consists of turning the bakers into technical service providers for their stakers. They are paid by the Edge of Baking Over Staking for this, while the stakers are exactly like bakers who do not run a machine but who invest themselves in the chain.
I would be in favor of that (surprisingly maybe). That would be a great improvement for decentralisation.
What?
Changing bakery because the vote happened = too late… …because the vote happened
Lack of research = not talking with your baker beforehand or checking their voting record etc…
An upgrade doesn’t just appear out of thin air. There’s months of work that’s being done and discussions being made and views being shared, even before the proposal drops.
Why can’t it be both?
Is there any reasons NOT to allow Stakers to vote?
None. Good proposal by @Primate411 Let the stakers vote. How about the delegators at 50%?
As a staker and delegator, I disagree with the idea.
Democracy’s other side is acquiring information to enhance decision quality. Blockchain governance involves complex mathematics, computer technology, and economics. If the group participating in Tezos governance decision-making lacks this knowledge and training, even allowing all XTZ holders to vote becomes meaningless, as it is difficult to make decisions that align with the long-term interests of the community.
For example, in a court trial, the presence of professional defense attorneys and other specialists is essential. If these professionals are lacking and ordinary jury members participate in voting on the guilt of a case, it could likely lead to many tragic verdicts.
Recent rounds of voting on the Tezos platform have seen significant controversy, particularly surrounding the economic aspects of the protocol, which involve many stakeholders.
In practice, voters typically do not prioritize the long-term maximization of the Tezos community’s interests; instead, they often focus on maximizing their own individual benefits. While voters may claim that their decisions consider the long-term development of Tezos, this is frequently just an excuse.
The Hen community on the Tezos platform serves as a case study. The community is composed of diverse members who lack governance expertise, and differing short-sighted interests hinder the development of Hen.
Therefore, my suggestions are as follows:
First, bakers play a crucial role in maintaining network security, but they may lack the judgment needed for complex issues. For matters that are intricate and specialized, it is essential to involve professionals who can provide objective and rational analyses. These professionals should not have voting power; instead, they can offer insights that community members may lack.
Second, it is important to allow bakers sufficient time to communicate with stakers and delegators. This will enable them to switch their support to the side that aligns with their interests without risking losses in XTZ or wasting time. This approach is similar to how presidential candidates in the United States engage with voters prior to elections, clearly articulating their governance proposals.
These ideas may involve cost implications and technical challenges, and I approach this discussion with a humble mindset. I welcome your thoughts and encourage open dialogue without any pressure or reservations. However, I ask that any expressions of opinion be grounded in rational analysis based on factual evidence.
If I’m understanding the gist of your post, you are proposing that a panel of experts (i.e. an economist, cryptographer, sociologist) are gathered, I’m assuming they will be compensated for their expertise, and this panel will disseminate their views on any proposals so that bakers can then make a more “informed” decision.
While I think this is a good idea in theory:
Where will this panel be paid from?
The time needed for a review by the panel and then bakers to communicate with their stakers and delegators would require a longer proposal period than we currently have.
A system for the bakers to communicate with the stakers/delegators would need to be established. I may be wrong on this since I’m new but from what I see the current system leaves it up to the bakers on how much they wish to engage with the public.
I apologize if I misunderstood your post, I did get confused by the mixing of the duties of all three branches of government which are separate for a reason. Like in your first example you use how the judicial branch functions as a case for how the legislative should.
I hope I haven’t misunderstood the point because I do think it’s an interesting approach.
Hello. I am very pleased with your reply. You didn’t misunderstand my thoughts, and the questions you raised are also the actual problems faced by tezos.
Where will this panel be paid from?
The funds will be temporarily allocated by the Tezos Foundation. In the future, if the Tezos network is successful, funds can be allocated from the Tezos community treasury to support the construction of the expert panel. Currently, there are not many obstacles from the community in the Tezos proposal upgrade process, so the expenditure will not be too large.
Looking back at the past history, the Tezos Foundation has funded many failed projects and spent a lot of money on marketing, and these funds have not made significant and practical contributions to the growth of the Tezos network. Later, I will take the time to sort out the worthless spending of the foundation.
If the Tezos community can influence the closed - ended foundation system and reduce meaningless waste of funds, it should be possible to successfully form an expert organization of the Tezos community.
The time needed for a review by the panel and then bakers to communicate with their stakers and delegators would require a longer proposal period than we currently have.
Tezos can create the role of liaison to assist bakers in communicating with stakers and delegators, quickly promoting the formation of consensus. The rewards for the liaison role can be allocated from the Tezos community rewards.
From the perspective of network profitability, the profit cash flow generated by the Tezos network is relatively small, similar to that of start - up technology companies. If there is a shortage of funds, some community rewards can be reduced so that the expenses are spent on the most practically valuable areas.
A system for the bakers to communicate with the stakers/delegators would need to be established. I may be wrong on this since I’m new but from what I see the current system leaves it up to the bakers on how much they wish to engage with the public.
The problems that need to be communicated at present are not complicated, and they can be solved by using mature software applications in the market. For example, in China, we use Feishu to manage internal collaboration within community organizations, and it works very well. This is also one of the reasons why Chinese innovative products iterate quickly. Of course, this is not within the scope of today’s discussion topic.
I’m a new baker and I’ve been struggling with the best way to identify and interact with my delegators and stakers specifically (not the general public). I imagine delegators within most bakeries have differences in opinions. I think it would be best to have delegators and stalkers vote independently, and baker’s vote would count for individuals that don’t vote
I think that it is a good discussion to have whether on-chain governance should be tied (again) with putting funds at stake – or even extended further.
But before starting with enshrining any such changes (and which ones) in the protocol, we could have other on-chain approaches to signal an appetite for this.
For instance, a lower hanging fruit would be imho to have a voting contract where bakers set up their own rules (who votes, e.g. their stakers/delegators, and how much weight to give to their voices), and use this to inform their choice.
Any such contract cannot be enforceable at the moment without protocol changes, but it would be a good place to start.
