Tezos needs to become brave again

I am writing this with love.

That matters, because criticism without love turns into sport. It turns into dunking. It turns into the cheap pleasure of sounding right while something you care about keeps drifting.

I do not want to dunk on Tezos.

I have given years of my life to this ecosystem. I have sat with bakers at every level of sophistication. I have helped people through upgrades, key migrations, voting confusion, payout issues, protocol changes, TezSign, TezGov, and the thousand small anxieties that only show up when real people are using real infrastructure with real funds at risk.

I have defended Tezos when it was easy. I have defended Tezos when it was lonely. I have defended Tezos because I still believe there is something here worth defending.

But love also has a duty to tell the truth.

And the truth is this: Tezos no longer owns the frontier of on-chain governance.

We helped define that frontier. We should be proud of that. Tezos gave crypto one of its most serious attempts at self-amendment: a chain that can propose, vote, test, and activate protocol upgrades without hard forks. That mattered. It still matters. The protocol amendment process remains one of the great pieces of blockchain design.

But the rest of the world did not stand still while we admired the elegance of our own machinery.

Polkadot now has OpenGov, where all referenda are public, proposals move through specialized origins and tracks, multiple referenda can be active at once, and voters can delegate differently across domains. Their treasury is not just a vague ecosystem promise. It is an on-chain pot funded by fees, inflation, slashing, and other inflows, with treasury proposals, bounties, tips, and spending tracks routed through governance.

Cardano has Project Catalyst. Whatever one thinks of Cardano, and I have many criticisms, they are actively trying to work out decentralized funding in public. Catalyst says it has funded 2,221 proposals, with more than $150M in total funding, more than 11,000 proposals voted on, and millions of votes cast.

Again, this is not me saying Cardano has solved governance. It has not. It is messy. It is political. It is often chaotic.

But there is life in the chaos.

Optimism has built governance around a Token House, a Citizens’ House, public capital allocation, retroactive public goods funding, governance fund proposals, and a revenue model where OP Chains contribute back into a shared treasury.

Arbitrum has a DAO with tokenholder voting, Arbitrum Improvement Proposals, and a built-in treasury smart contract whose funds can be directed by governance.

These systems are imperfect. Some are plutocratic. Some are captured. Some are wildly inefficient. Some will probably create their own ugly politics and backlash.

But they are alive.

People are arguing there. Builders are proposing there. Delegates are building reputations there. Public goods people are trying to figure out how to get paid there. Communities are learning, badly and publicly, what it means to allocate shared resources without pretending a foundation can carry the entire moral burden of the ecosystem forever.

That used to feel like our arena.

Now, too often, Tezos feels like a chain with brilliant governance plumbing and no living room where the family actually gathers.

We have a protocol that can amend itself, but we do not have a serious, widely used, community-legible on-chain funding system for the people trying to keep the ecosystem alive.

We have a history of upgrades, but not enough culture of invitation.

We have technical credibility, but not enough emotional credibility.

We have principles, but principles have to become practices or they become museum pieces.

I am saying this as someone who has spent too much time in the trenches to mistake vibes for nothing. Vibes matter. Spirit matters. The emotional posture of an ecosystem matters.

Right now, Tezos too often gives off a closed energy. A repelling energy. A sense that if you are already inside the right rooms, you may be heard, but if you are outside those rooms, you must prove your worth through endurance, patience, and pain.

That is poison for builders.

It is poison for small teams.

It is poison for the strange, stubborn, undercapitalized people who make ecosystems feel alive before the metrics catch up.

Tezos has always had those people. Artists. Bakers. Toolmakers. Indexer teams. Wallet teams. Support people. Protocol researchers. Weirdos with conviction. The kind of people who do not need a giant marketing campaign to care, but who do need a reason to believe the chain cares back.

Too many of them have burned out.

Too many have left quietly.

Too many are still here, but in a smaller, dimmer way.

And the tragedy is that we keep acting like this is mainly a technology problem.

It is not mainly a technology problem.

The technology matters. Of course it matters. Tezos has shipped again and again. The protocol has evolved. The chain has avoided many of the catastrophic failures other ecosystems have normalized. There is real engineering substance here.

But substance alone does not create an ecosystem.

An ecosystem also needs circulation. It needs oxygen. It needs paths for new people to enter. It needs ways for small teams to receive trust before they are already successful. It needs public processes that people can understand. It needs funding mechanisms that do not feel like supplication. It needs criticism that is not treated as betrayal. It needs leadership that can hear pain without becoming defensive.

Most of all, it needs open hearts and open minds from the people with access to power.

I know that phrase sounds soft. It is not soft.

Open hearts and open minds are hard. They require people with status to admit that the room has become too small. They require institutions to accept that opacity has costs even when the intentions behind it are good. They require funders to stop seeing grassroots builders as risk and start seeing neglected grassroots energy as the greater risk. They require the community to stop confusing survival with health.

Tezos raised enormous expectations. We cannot keep behaving like we are still in a seed stage, still waiting for someone else to discover us, still waiting for the next protocol upgrade to solve a crisis of belonging.

We need a serious conversation about on-chain funding.

We need a serious conversation about public goods.

We need a serious conversation about how builders get from idea to first grant to sustainable operation without needing personal connections, heroic persistence, or a miracle.

We need a serious conversation about what should be decided by foundations, what should be decided by tokenholders, what should be decided by bakers, what should be delegated to expert councils, and what should be pushed into transparent community processes.

And we need to have that conversation without sneering at the chains that are already experimenting.

Polkadot’s treasury is not beneath us.

Cardano Catalyst is not beneath us.

Optimism’s public goods work is not beneath us.

Arbitrum’s DAO treasury is not beneath us.

We can study them without worshiping them. We can criticize them without dismissing them. We can learn from their failures before our own failures harden into culture.

Tezos should be one of the places where the future of decentralized governance is being worked out in public. Not just protocol amendments. Not just baker votes. Not just periodic upgrades.

The fuller thing: how a living network funds itself, refreshes itself, welcomes new contributors, rewards unglamorous maintenance, and makes shared decisions without becoming either a bureaucracy or a popularity contest.

That is the frontier now.

And we are late to it.

I say that with grief, because Tezos had every reason to lead here. We had the philosophy. We had the mechanism. We had the early credibility. We had the community memory of why governance matters.

But a lead is not a birthright. A lead has to be renewed.

If we want Tezos to matter in this next era, we need to become brave again.

Brave enough to admit that other ecosystems caught up.

Brave enough to admit that some have passed us in governance culture, even if our protocol remains beautiful.

Brave enough to fund small builders before they become obvious.

Brave enough to make funding legible, participatory, and accountable.

Brave enough to let the community argue in public without treating argument as damage.

Brave enough to build structures that outlive personal relationships and private rooms.

Brave enough to look at people who are frustrated, exhausted, or angry and ask what truth they are carrying for us.

I still believe Tezos can do this.

I believe it because I have seen the best of this place. I have seen bakers show up for strangers. I have seen artists carry the chain’s soul when the rest of the market forgot we existed. I have seen infrastructure people keep working long after the incentives stopped making sense.

I have seen builders choose Tezos for reasons that were almost spiritual: because the chain felt principled, resilient, serious, and weird in the right way.

That spirit is still here.

But it needs air.

It needs permission to move.

It needs the people holding the levers of power to stop guarding the past and start opening the future.

This is a wake-up call, but it is not a funeral bell.

Tezos is not dead. Tezos is not doomed. Tezos is not out of ideas.

Tezos is loved by people who are tired of watching it behave smaller than it is.

We can keep telling ourselves that the tech will win, that the next upgrade will win, that the market will eventually understand, that the world will circle back to our principles.

Or we can make the principles visible again.

We can build the public funding layer Tezos should have had by now.

We can make governance feel alive again.

We can invite the builders back.

We can become expansive without becoming unserious.

We can become open without becoming naive.

We can become spiritual without becoming vague.

That is the work.

Get spiritual or get left behind.

7 Likes

I feel ya, and I fully support what are you saying.

I’m all in for onchain (or offchain) treasury, but please, not with XTZ. Let’s use stables, use wrapped bitcoins, use venture capital, but please please please not our precious XTZ. At least not until it’s strong enough to hold it’s value over time.

Since June 2025, Tezos outperformed in price all the pack you mentioned (Cardano, OP, ARB, DOT) - so what they do have, didn’t help them to hold their ground in the slightest - mostly because they do one common “altcoin” mistake - relying on “lets fund with our native token” without anticipating how buyer (and also trader) gonna react. Buyer is an interesting creature overall - he tends to react to MSTR 32 BTC sell with 10x stronger impulse than MSTR 2000 BTC buy. Collective trader is a cold and heartless mix of algorithms, designed to extract maximum possible value from any asset strength or weakness. Those can multiply on zero any our good intentions if we don’t account for them as formiddable powers

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This ia a good point indeed.

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All I can say is… tell me more!

Let’s use the bear market in the most ruthless and efficient way possible.

Tezos puts info out there on websites here there and everywhere just expecting people to magically find it. There’s no uniformity. It needs to 10-fold its promotional efforts of, well, anything. Tezos X was the perfect opportunity for this, yet, nothing.

Always appreciate Primate’s contribution to the Tezos community. He has helped me numerous times with technical questions every since I started baking in 2022. Like everyone, I’m disappointed in the price performance, and I always wonder how all the stuff - layer one, dApps, etc - is sustainable at only 25 cents. I’m with weiss, forget funding with xtz - need actual currency or stable coins. I’ll be glad to contribute more to projects, regardless of where the treasury is, but my contribution would be microscopic, merely symbolic How do we attract the big investors? Does Tezos have big ideas to attract those investors? Will they see a favorable ROI from Tezos X?

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Late, but this deserved a reply.

There are bold bets, which are moving quickly. Being a leader in the post-quantum transition is one. But protocol differentiation isn’t enough for success and we need to think about shipping bold products , metals.io being one example.

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I am not sure that the focus should be on shipping products. The TF function should be shipping Tezos and facilitating builders IMO. I don’t think either one of those has been properly addressed and given fair focus. Product development will come from a healthy ecosystem of support and collaboration that is fostered by the Foundation. Otherwise anything that does get built feels alone and lacks the cultural support walls. It can’t be done in a vacuum. There is plenty of precedent for how to do this effectively, but I think it starts with limiting the scope of the Foundation’s footing to core Tezos and not being so worried about product development or brand deals. Those things are great when you have already built the foundational elements but I don’t think we have that now.

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Tezos core improvements are shipping: Tezos X, post-quantum, the regular protocol upgrades. That doesn’t mean there can’t be a focus on products.

We depart on the order of operations. “Fund the community well enough and great products will grow out of it” has been tried, for years and at scale. Tons of grant money went out, and very little of it turned into things people actually use. Hic et Nunc is the one clear success, and it came from a small hackathon grant. We still do hackathons by the way, see Shipyard.

To reiterate the point I made at TezDev: the strategy is to fund products that demonstrate real traction and revenue, not spraying and praying.

One more thing: the public funding layer @Primate411 mentions largely exists already, and it’s aimed exactly at builders early on.

  • The Tezos Ecosystem DAO is an on-chain treasury on Homebase, with tez-holder voting, open to anyone. You cited it yourself in April as the model working as designed. TF offered to fund it more if people used it. By and large, they haven’t.
  • The Tezos Commons Small Grants Program covers the “fund small builders before they’re obvious” case.

Participation in the DAO has been quite thin as v32 puts it in the thread. The problem isn’t the lack of a funding mechanism it’s the willingness to use it. If you want to be brave here, rally people to use it.

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The Tezos Ecosystem DAO has been funded once years ago and no longer has funds to cover much of anything. Numerous questions about what’s happening with the Ecosystem DAO have gone in the wind.

When people wanted to put in requests for more than was available in the Ecosystem DAO treasury, they were told not to. That looks like deprecation. It’s hard to be brave and confident when quiet deprecation is the appearance presented to the outside world. Let’s try not to look so deprecated and then see how this public funding layer works.

The problem has always been sitting back and waiting for adroit extractooooors to regale with their hopeful wares. You can’t honestly say you tried funding things when you don’t proactively go out and empower builders in the wild or build systems that do it for you.

You say you look for traction but traction is already there. You’re waiting for someone to bring you traction. I’m saying, go look for traction in the wild and support it proactively in some way. Even some Claude tokens would do it. I tried sending builders who just needed some API credits to keep building on Tezos to Trilitech contacts and they didn’t get anything from it but a conversation.

The way things appear, Trilitech works to empower itself, not necessarily support builders that are not affiliated with Trilitech. And I’m not saying that’s (i.e., supporting builders) what Trilitech should do necessarily but someone somewhere should be doing it.

There is no one proactively abiding in the community and boosting the good. That’s where a lot of the frustration is coming from. You have a couple dozen of people in the community who have been through it all and who’re still building and trying things. No one is going around collecting/boosting 100X’s on Tezos and it shows as they fall away. Whilst on other chains, just this strategy has made them their bones. Relying on genuine affinity is so underrated. Tezos has so much, other chains have so little. But they use what little they have while Tezos does not.

Ultimately you have to have some intelligence and proactive forces that help build little grassroots enclaves. Until the day that happens, you can’t honestly say you tried funding it all. You simply gave funds to mercantile folks who came to you with their polished presentation and called that the attempt and the failure. This is not about checking boxes from the 100,000 foot view. If it was, Tezos would already be a household name.

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Please don’t misunderstand me. I did not say core is not shipping. I said the focus should remain there and on development experience, not on product development. My argument is that you have come to us previously with funding strains and explaining there is a limit to the resources and teams are downsizing, so then doesn’t it make sense to narrow focus to the core aspects? Those same core aspects, like the development workflows, that are today experiencing active discussion and unhappiness over the status quo. This is a time to get our core solid and set for the new paradigms, not try to maintain a split focus. If the core is done well, the rest becomes an easy sell. Today that is not the case. Trying to onboard a developer to Tezos is embarrassing enough I have avoided doing so personally.

Just in the past 12 months I can list out far more missteps than wins for Tezos. The teams and the structure and the funding are not well-architected to support the range-of-motion Tezos as an entity will need in the future.

This is not about being able to point to one thing and saying you checked the box. We have to look at the wider ecosystem. What is working and what really isn’t? For that, who better to provide you some insight than those of us still in the trenches building dApps and being in the thick of it. We are giving you feedback that by all rights you should have to pay for, at least don’t ignore it or claim to have checked the box and walk away from the discussion.

What was done was not enough, it didn’t do the job it was setup to do, and clearly there is a lack of true accountability in that area. In the professional world you don’t set out to do a project until you understand why and what KPIs will tell you if it was a success or failure. What KPIs do you use that measure success? Because where the rubber meets the road I assure you it feels a mess.

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Not at all to mention the huge ethical red flags I see with how the Tezos institution has handled Jev and ECAD. The rest of us see these patterns and I assure you we all think twice about releasing the next tool to be stolen unceremoniously and rebranded. THESE are the things we MUST get right, or everything else is for naught.

Reading @murbard’s reply here alongside yesterday’s announcement in #7242 that day-to-day Tezos L1 and Etherlink development on gitlab.com/tezos/tezos is moving to a private repository on December 2, it is worth looking directly at the public economic and corporate record of what the Tezos ecosystem has become since 2021.

1. Not a Functioning Ecosystem: A Vertically Integrated Monopsony

In a functioning blockchain ecosystem, independent companies build products and infrastructure funded by user fees, commercial customers, or competing capital sources. What exists on Tezos today is an economic monopsony: a market with a single dominant buyer of protocol, tooling, indexing, and wallet labor (the Tezos Foundation as capital allocator, paired with the consolidated Trilitech and Nomadic Labs corporate group as in-house supplier and technical reviewer).

In economic terms, it is structurally worse than a single-employer mining town, because a mining town at least exports physical ore to external buyers outside the town. Look at the actual on-chain fee activity outside Foundation patronage right now:

  • Tezos L1 transaction fees (DefiLlama / TzKT, 18 Nov 2026): $71 USD over 24 hours, and $10,954 USD over the trailing 30 days (~$365/day, or ~$133,000/year annualized; daily burn value is down >99% in USD and ~95% in native XTZ from the September 2021 peak).
  • Etherlink L2 fees (Blockscout / DefiLlama, 18 Nov 2026): Roughly $29 USD per day (~140 XTZ/day) in L2 gas fees, while 98.6% ($15,063) of Etherlink’s $15,278 in 30-day application fees comes from a single institutional money-market issuer (Spiko) and $205 (~$6.83/day) comes from Uniswap V3.
  • Off-chain Foundation disbursements (2025 TF Biannual Activity Reports, H1 + H2 Financial Overview): $89,055,091 USD paid out to grantees and service providers in calendar year 2025, excluding investments and loans (~$244,000/day, or ~$10,166/hour).

The Tezos Foundation spends more endowment capital every 65 minutes (~$11,013) than the entire Tezos L1 blockchain generates in transaction fees in a full 30-day month ($10,954).

In a patronage economy where off-chain Foundation payouts exceed annualized L1 + L2 chain fee revenue (~$144K/year) by more than 600 to 1, external teams that still rely on Foundation grant renewals for payroll (wallets, indexers, marketplaces) have no alternative commercial market to fall back on. When the same house organization whose staff review external grant renewals simultaneously forks active upstream libraries (Taquito, @ecadlabs/beacon-*) into house replacements (octez.js, octez.connect) and publicly pitches migration away from upstream, no grant-dependent team can evaluate that choice in a neutral market free from funding-renewal risk. Contrast that with Kukai Wallet, which has received no Foundation development funding for years and continues to build on @taquito/* and @ecadlabs/beacon-* purely on engineering reliability and security responsiveness. (As anyone can verify in #7227, every feature and fix in Octez.js v25.1.0-rc.0, save for a single Etherlink alias helper, was copied straight from Taquito’s main branch after ECAD Labs was defunded, explicitly pitched “so that Taquito users can move to Octez.js without losing features or fixes”; and just today, 20 November 2026, ECAD Labs shipped two more upstream security releases in Taquito v25.1.2 and v25.1.3 for GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h and GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776 alongside Taquito v25.2.0-rc0 & @ecadlabs/beacon-sdk v4.9.0-ecad-rc.0 in #7244.)

2. Central Management and Control: What the Public UK Filings Show

Starting in July 2024, the Tezos Foundation removed the table disclosing core-entity funding allocations (Nomadic Labs, Trilitech) from its Biannual Activity Reports, highlighting $10.30M in newly approved external grant initiatives at the front of its two 2025 reports ($7.20M H1 + $3.10M H2) while disclosing $89.06M in executed payouts on the final page (leaving $78.76M/year unitemized). Similarly, Trilitech’s parent entity, Digital Commonwealth Foundation (DCF), is incorporated in Jersey, where its financial statements are not publicly available.

The catch is that once Trilitech Limited (UK Company No. 13532868) outgrew UK statutory small-company/small-group thresholds on turnover and headcount, and because DCF does not publish consolidated accounts in Jersey (Companies Act 2006, ss. 399 & 401), Trilitech Limited became statutorily required to file full, independently audited Consolidated Financial Statements on the public UK registry. Anyone can download the PDF directly from UK Companies House and read the notes for themselves:

Here is what those audited statutory filings record on their face:

  1. 100% Cash Acquisition of Nomadic Labs SAS (Note 9 & Note 15): On 30 June 2025 (more than 11 months before @murbard told this forum on 10 June 2026 in #7093/19, two months prior to the August 2026 publication of these accounts, that cutting independent teams is not “self-serving for these entities who pull the strings” and that “most of the cost cutting comes from reducing budgets to these entities”), Trilitech Limited acquired 100% of the issued share capital of Nomadic Labs SAS for £18,519,205 in cash (booking £15,201,652 in goodwill), financed by allotting 18,519,205 £1 shares to its Jersey parent, Digital Commonwealth Foundation (which Note 17 notes also controls undisclosed BVI undertakings and whose financial statements “are not publicly available”).
  2. Audited Group Revenue and Profit (Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income): In FY 2025 (12 months of Trilitech plus 6 months of post-acquisition Nomadic Labs), the Trilitech group recorded ÂŁ32,429,752 (~$41M-$42.5M USD) in operating revenue (ÂŁ29.09M turnover + ÂŁ3.34M R&D credit; standalone Trilitech turnover was ÂŁ22.20M vs. ÂŁ22.62M in 2024, -1.9%), booked ÂŁ2,202,839 (~$2.8M-$2.9M USD) in net profit after tax, and closed 2025 with ÂŁ4,937,632 in accumulated retained earnings and 144 average staff.
  3. Overlapping Governance: Trilitech Limited (now 100% owner of Nomadic Labs SAS) is governed by a three-person UK Board of Directors: Arthur Breitman (registered under his legal name Arthur Robert Meunier), Katelyn Hegarty (Chief of Staff), and Lodewijk van Setten (General Counsel), while Arthur simultaneously sits on the Tezos Foundation Council in Switzerland.

There is nothing unlawful about structuring a corporate group across Switzerland, Jersey, the UK, and France, or complying with formal conflict-of-interest procedures in each jurisdiction. Yet strip away that multi-jurisdictional legal sophistry and look at central management and control, and in my view the structural conflict is unmistakable: even assuming every formal Swiss Foundation recusal rule is observed to the letter when specific entity budgets are minuted, one individual sits simultaneously on the Swiss Foundation Council overseeing the endowment and ecosystem strategy and on the three-person UK Board of Directors of the consolidated contractor group (Trilitech Limited, now 100% owner of Nomadic Labs SAS) whose personnel review external grantees while building competing in-house forks. In our own renewal discussions with engineering leadership at Nomadic Labs, our counterparts were candid that they did not have final authority on terms and had to take proposals up to Arthur for sign-off. Bakers, builders, and token holders can read the Companies House filings and judge that governance structure for themselves.

3. The 2014 Vision vs. the 2021-2026 Record

In the 2014 Tezos Position Paper and White Paper, Arthur (“L.M. Goodman”) warned against the capture of a blockchain by a single core development team and proposed an open market for protocol upgrades where competing proposals would win on merit and be compensated via attached on-chain protocol invoices.

Look at where that vision stands after more than 8 years on mainnet and 21 on-chain governance upgrades (through protocol 025 Ushuaia):

  • Competing proposals (0 for 21 on-chain governance upgrades): Bakers have occasionally exercised veto power over specific features or parameters (such as rejecting Adaptive Issuance in Oxford 1), and Tez Capital attempted an independent parameter fork with Qena / Qena42 in 2024 (which won the Proposal period before failing Exploration after Nomadic Labs opposed it in #6478). Across all 21 governance upgrades activated on mainnet (004 Athens through 025 Ushuaia), however, zero proposals from outside the Foundation-funded core-contractor pipeline have ever passed.
  • Protocol invoices abandoned: Only 6 protocol invoice payouts across 5 upgrades, totaling 28,700 XTZ (~$25,091 at activation prices), were ever executed on Tezos mainnet, and zero have been paid since Lima in December 2022 (invoice_contract in init_storage.ml has been commented out across the last 10 consecutive protocol directories, 016 Mumbai through 025 Ushuaia). Off-chain Foundation payouts in 2025 alone ($89.06M) were 3,549x the cumulative USD value of every on-chain protocol invoice paid in Tezos history.
  • L1 protocol cadence winding down (despite the claim above of “the regular protocol upgrades”): After 024 Tallinn activated in January 2026 (followed by 6 empty epochs) and 025 Ushuaia activated on 30 June 2026, Tezos went through 9 consecutive empty Proposal epochs (Epochs 91 to 99) plus a failed 1-upvote vanity proposal in Epoch 100 (15 of the 17 completed governance epochs in 2026 had no proposals), with still no 026 upgrade proposed nearly five months after Ushuaia. That matches what has been communicated in proto-ecosystem calls and negotiations: L1 protocol changes are winding down toward minimal maintenance.

Arthur joined the Tezos Foundation Council on 24 February 2021 and incorporated Trilitech Limited on 27 July 2021. While macro crypto conditions are routinely blamed for XTZ, Tezos has suffered a severe relative decline against peer networks across every measurable benchmark over that exact window:

Metric Feb / Jul 2021 Baseline 17 Nov 2026 UTC Close Relative Change
BTC Price $49,705 (24 Feb '21) / $39,407 (27 Jul '21) $64,894 +30.6% / +64.7%
ETH Price $1,627 (24 Feb '21) / $2,298 (27 Jul '21) $1,823 +12.1% / -20.7%
SOL Price $17.30 (24 Feb '21) / $28.07 (27 Jul '21) $75.11 +334.1% / +167.6%
XTZ Price $3.53 (24 Feb '21) / $2.86 (27 Jul '21) $0.21 -94.0% / -92.6%
XTZ / BTC Ratio 0.00007111 BTC (Feb '21) / 0.00007265 BTC (Jul '21) 0.00000327 BTC -95.40% / -95.49%
XTZ / ETH Ratio 0.002173 ETH (Feb '21) / 0.001246 ETH (Jul '21) 0.0001165 ETH -94.64% / -90.64%
XTZ / SOL Ratio 0.2043 SOL (Feb '21) / 0.1020 SOL (Jul '21) 0.002829 SOL -98.62% / -97.23%
Market Cap Rank #10-#25 ($2.5B-$2.7B, 2020-Feb '21) #145 ($228.5M, CoinGecko) Entire XTZ market cap ($228.5M) is less than half of TF’s published $530M Dec 2025 treasury (0.43x, or 0.50x of $454M non-XTZ assets)
DeFi TVL (DefiLlama) $205.3M L1 peak (Oct '21); $83.3M Etherlink peak (Nov '25 subsidies) $18.26M L1 (#56) + $6.67M Etherlink (#79) -91.1% L1 / -92.0% L2; annual TF spend ($89.06M) is 3.57x combined L1+L2 TVL ($24.93M)
Active L1 Bakers (TzKT) 380 (Feb '21) / 393 (Sep '21) 192 (Cycle 1419) ~50% loss (-49.5% vs. Feb '21; -51.1% vs. Sep '21; 266 -> 192 in the past 12 months)

Losing 95.4% against Bitcoin, 94.6% against Ethereum (90.6% since July 2021), and 98.6% against Solana over a 5.7-year window in which Bitcoin rose +30.6% (+64.7% since Trilitech’s incorporation) and Solana rose +334% cannot be explained away as “macro conditions.”

4. Credit Where Due on the Art Scene, and Why the Trajectory Is Not Stated Plainly

As @Primate411 pointed out, the one movement that kept Tezos culturally vibrant over the past five years was the grassroots counter-culture art community sparked organically by Hic et Nunc (HEN) in March 2021 and sustained by independent builders and artists across Teia, Objkt, and fxhash. And to be fair to the Tezos Foundation and Trilitech, they employed dedicated arts leads, funded exhibitions at Art Basel and major museums, and put real grant support behind that community. It would be unfair not to credit that support.

Still, a grassroots digital art movement cannot by itself carry the infrastructure economics of a Layer 1 blockchain ($71 in 24-hour L1 fees; $365/day 30-day average) when independent infrastructure companies across the rest of the stack have been steadily pushed out or replaced in-house.

When community members ask on this forum why leadership has not shared a transparent ecosystem roadmap, in my view the issue is not the absence of a strategy; it is that the effective trajectory visible across these public filings, governance votes, and repository changes would be difficult to defend plainly to XTZ token holders:

  • Tezos L1 protocol development winding down toward minimal maintenance;
  • Independent ecosystem companies giving way to a single consolidated corporate group (Digital Commonwealth Foundation → Trilitech Limited → Nomadic Labs SAS) backed by tens of millions of dollars a year in unitemized Foundation payouts;
  • Public accountability surfaces (Biannual Report core-entity tables, linear.app/tezos, proto-ecosystem calls, Slack, and now day-to-day development on gitlab.com/tezos/tezos in #7242) closing one after another; and
  • Strategic focus shifting toward commercial ventures generating corporate “traction and revenue” inside the house group (ÂŁ32.43M operating revenue and ÂŁ2.20M net profit after tax at Trilitech in 2025), while XTZ holders, bakers, and artists hold a token whose entire circulating market cap ($228.5M) now sits at less than half of the $530M Foundation treasury originally raised to build an open, decentralized Tezos ecosystem.
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