Tezos needs to become brave again

Reading @murbard’s reply here alongside yesterday’s announcement in #7242 that day-to-day Tezos L1 and Etherlink development on gitlab.com/tezos/tezos is moving to a private repository on December 2, it is worth looking directly at the public economic and corporate record of what the Tezos ecosystem has become since 2021.

1. Not a Functioning Ecosystem: A Vertically Integrated Monopsony

In a functioning blockchain ecosystem, independent companies build products and infrastructure funded by user fees, commercial customers, or competing capital sources. What exists on Tezos today is an economic monopsony: a market with a single dominant buyer of protocol, tooling, indexing, and wallet labor (the Tezos Foundation as capital allocator, paired with the consolidated Trilitech and Nomadic Labs corporate group as in-house supplier and technical reviewer).

In economic terms, it is structurally worse than a single-employer mining town, because a mining town at least exports physical ore to external buyers outside the town. Look at the actual on-chain fee activity outside Foundation patronage right now:

  • Tezos L1 transaction fees (DefiLlama / TzKT, 18 Nov 2026): $71 USD over 24 hours, and $10,954 USD over the trailing 30 days (~$365/day, or ~$133,000/year annualized; daily burn value is down >99% in USD and ~95% in native XTZ from the September 2021 peak).
  • Etherlink L2 fees (Blockscout / DefiLlama, 18 Nov 2026): Roughly $29 USD per day (~140 XTZ/day) in L2 gas fees, while 98.6% ($15,063) of Etherlink’s $15,278 in 30-day application fees comes from a single institutional money-market issuer (Spiko) and $205 (~$6.83/day) comes from Uniswap V3.
  • Off-chain Foundation disbursements (2025 TF Biannual Activity Reports, H1 + H2 Financial Overview): $89,055,091 USD paid out to grantees and service providers in calendar year 2025, excluding investments and loans (~$244,000/day, or ~$10,166/hour).

The Tezos Foundation spends more endowment capital every 65 minutes (~$11,013) than the entire Tezos L1 blockchain generates in transaction fees in a full 30-day month ($10,954).

In a patronage economy where off-chain Foundation payouts exceed annualized L1 + L2 chain fee revenue (~$144K/year) by more than 600 to 1, external teams that still rely on Foundation grant renewals for payroll (wallets, indexers, marketplaces) have no alternative commercial market to fall back on. When the same house organization whose staff review external grant renewals simultaneously forks active upstream libraries (Taquito, @ecadlabs/beacon-*) into house replacements (octez.js, octez.connect) and publicly pitches migration away from upstream, no grant-dependent team can evaluate that choice in a neutral market free from funding-renewal risk. Contrast that with Kukai Wallet, which has received no Foundation development funding for years and continues to build on @taquito/* and @ecadlabs/beacon-* purely on engineering reliability and security responsiveness. (As anyone can verify in #7227, every feature and fix in Octez.js v25.1.0-rc.0, save for a single Etherlink alias helper, was copied straight from Taquito’s main branch after ECAD Labs was defunded, explicitly pitched “so that Taquito users can move to Octez.js without losing features or fixes”; and just today, 20 November 2026, ECAD Labs shipped two more upstream security releases in Taquito v25.1.2 and v25.1.3 for GHSA-9wjf-4grc-2g2h and GHSA-6r9w-cxjj-5776 alongside Taquito v25.2.0-rc0 & @ecadlabs/beacon-sdk v4.9.0-ecad-rc.0 in #7244.)

2. Central Management and Control: What the Public UK Filings Show

Starting in July 2024, the Tezos Foundation removed the table disclosing core-entity funding allocations (Nomadic Labs, Trilitech) from its Biannual Activity Reports, highlighting $10.30M in newly approved external grant initiatives at the front of its two 2025 reports ($7.20M H1 + $3.10M H2) while disclosing $89.06M in executed payouts on the final page (leaving $78.76M/year unitemized). Similarly, Trilitech’s parent entity, Digital Commonwealth Foundation (DCF), is incorporated in Jersey, where its financial statements are not publicly available.

The catch is that once Trilitech Limited (UK Company No. 13532868) outgrew UK statutory small-company/small-group thresholds on turnover and headcount, and because DCF does not publish consolidated accounts in Jersey (Companies Act 2006, ss. 399 & 401), Trilitech Limited became statutorily required to file full, independently audited Consolidated Financial Statements on the public UK registry. Anyone can download the PDF directly from UK Companies House and read the notes for themselves:

Here is what those audited statutory filings record on their face:

  1. 100% Cash Acquisition of Nomadic Labs SAS (Note 9 & Note 15): On 30 June 2025 (more than 11 months before @murbard told this forum on 10 June 2026 in #7093/19, two months prior to the August 2026 publication of these accounts, that cutting independent teams is not “self-serving for these entities who pull the strings” and that “most of the cost cutting comes from reducing budgets to these entities”), Trilitech Limited acquired 100% of the issued share capital of Nomadic Labs SAS for £18,519,205 in cash (booking £15,201,652 in goodwill), financed by allotting 18,519,205 £1 shares to its Jersey parent, Digital Commonwealth Foundation (which Note 17 notes also controls undisclosed BVI undertakings and whose financial statements “are not publicly available”).
  2. Audited Group Revenue and Profit (Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income): In FY 2025 (12 months of Trilitech plus 6 months of post-acquisition Nomadic Labs), the Trilitech group recorded £32,429,752 (~$41M-$42.5M USD) in operating revenue (£29.09M turnover + £3.34M R&D credit; standalone Trilitech turnover was £22.20M vs. £22.62M in 2024, -1.9%), booked £2,202,839 (~$2.8M-$2.9M USD) in net profit after tax, and closed 2025 with £4,937,632 in accumulated retained earnings and 144 average staff.
  3. Overlapping Governance: Trilitech Limited (now 100% owner of Nomadic Labs SAS) is governed by a three-person UK Board of Directors: Arthur Breitman (registered under his legal name Arthur Robert Meunier), Katelyn Hegarty (Chief of Staff), and Lodewijk van Setten (General Counsel), while Arthur simultaneously sits on the Tezos Foundation Council in Switzerland.

There is nothing unlawful about structuring a corporate group across Switzerland, Jersey, the UK, and France, or complying with formal conflict-of-interest procedures in each jurisdiction. Yet strip away that multi-jurisdictional legal sophistry and look at central management and control, and in my view the structural conflict is unmistakable: even assuming every formal Swiss Foundation recusal rule is observed to the letter when specific entity budgets are minuted, one individual sits simultaneously on the Swiss Foundation Council overseeing the endowment and ecosystem strategy and on the three-person UK Board of Directors of the consolidated contractor group (Trilitech Limited, now 100% owner of Nomadic Labs SAS) whose personnel review external grantees while building competing in-house forks. In our own renewal discussions with engineering leadership at Nomadic Labs, our counterparts were candid that they did not have final authority on terms and had to take proposals up to Arthur for sign-off. Bakers, builders, and token holders can read the Companies House filings and judge that governance structure for themselves.

3. The 2014 Vision vs. the 2021-2026 Record

In the 2014 Tezos Position Paper and White Paper, Arthur (“L.M. Goodman”) warned against the capture of a blockchain by a single core development team and proposed an open market for protocol upgrades where competing proposals would win on merit and be compensated via attached on-chain protocol invoices.

Look at where that vision stands after more than 8 years on mainnet and 21 on-chain governance upgrades (through protocol 025 Ushuaia):

  • Competing proposals (0 for 21 on-chain governance upgrades): Bakers have occasionally exercised veto power over specific features or parameters (such as rejecting Adaptive Issuance in Oxford 1), and Tez Capital attempted an independent parameter fork with Qena / Qena42 in 2024 (which won the Proposal period before failing Exploration after Nomadic Labs opposed it in #6478). Across all 21 governance upgrades activated on mainnet (004 Athens through 025 Ushuaia), however, zero proposals from outside the Foundation-funded core-contractor pipeline have ever passed.
  • Protocol invoices abandoned: Only 6 protocol invoice payouts across 5 upgrades, totaling 28,700 XTZ (~$25,091 at activation prices), were ever executed on Tezos mainnet, and zero have been paid since Lima in December 2022 (invoice_contract in init_storage.ml has been commented out across the last 10 consecutive protocol directories, 016 Mumbai through 025 Ushuaia). Off-chain Foundation payouts in 2025 alone ($89.06M) were 3,549x the cumulative USD value of every on-chain protocol invoice paid in Tezos history.
  • L1 protocol cadence winding down (despite the claim above of “the regular protocol upgrades”): After 024 Tallinn activated in January 2026 (followed by 6 empty epochs) and 025 Ushuaia activated on 30 June 2026, Tezos went through 9 consecutive empty Proposal epochs (Epochs 91 to 99) plus a failed 1-upvote vanity proposal in Epoch 100 (15 of the 17 completed governance epochs in 2026 had no proposals), with still no 026 upgrade proposed nearly five months after Ushuaia. That matches what has been communicated in proto-ecosystem calls and negotiations: L1 protocol changes are winding down toward minimal maintenance.

Arthur joined the Tezos Foundation Council on 24 February 2021 and incorporated Trilitech Limited on 27 July 2021. While macro crypto conditions are routinely blamed for XTZ, Tezos has suffered a severe relative decline against peer networks across every measurable benchmark over that exact window:

Metric Feb / Jul 2021 Baseline 17 Nov 2026 UTC Close Relative Change
BTC Price $49,705 (24 Feb '21) / $39,407 (27 Jul '21) $64,894 +30.6% / +64.7%
ETH Price $1,627 (24 Feb '21) / $2,298 (27 Jul '21) $1,823 +12.1% / -20.7%
SOL Price $17.30 (24 Feb '21) / $28.07 (27 Jul '21) $75.11 +334.1% / +167.6%
XTZ Price $3.53 (24 Feb '21) / $2.86 (27 Jul '21) $0.21 -94.0% / -92.6%
XTZ / BTC Ratio 0.00007111 BTC (Feb '21) / 0.00007265 BTC (Jul '21) 0.00000327 BTC -95.40% / -95.49%
XTZ / ETH Ratio 0.002173 ETH (Feb '21) / 0.001246 ETH (Jul '21) 0.0001165 ETH -94.64% / -90.64%
XTZ / SOL Ratio 0.2043 SOL (Feb '21) / 0.1020 SOL (Jul '21) 0.002829 SOL -98.62% / -97.23%
Market Cap Rank #10-#25 ($2.5B-$2.7B, 2020-Feb '21) #145 ($228.5M, CoinGecko) Entire XTZ market cap ($228.5M) is less than half of TF’s published $530M Dec 2025 treasury (0.43x, or 0.50x of $454M non-XTZ assets)
DeFi TVL (DefiLlama) $205.3M L1 peak (Oct '21); $83.3M Etherlink peak (Nov '25 subsidies) $18.26M L1 (#56) + $6.67M Etherlink (#79) -91.1% L1 / -92.0% L2; annual TF spend ($89.06M) is 3.57x combined L1+L2 TVL ($24.93M)
Active L1 Bakers (TzKT) 380 (Feb '21) / 393 (Sep '21) 192 (Cycle 1419) ~50% loss (-49.5% vs. Feb '21; -51.1% vs. Sep '21; 266 -> 192 in the past 12 months)

Losing 95.4% against Bitcoin, 94.6% against Ethereum (90.6% since July 2021), and 98.6% against Solana over a 5.7-year window in which Bitcoin rose +30.6% (+64.7% since Trilitech’s incorporation) and Solana rose +334% cannot be explained away as “macro conditions.”

4. Credit Where Due on the Art Scene, and Why the Trajectory Is Not Stated Plainly

As @Primate411 pointed out, the one movement that kept Tezos culturally vibrant over the past five years was the grassroots counter-culture art community sparked organically by Hic et Nunc (HEN) in March 2021 and sustained by independent builders and artists across Teia, Objkt, and fxhash. And to be fair to the Tezos Foundation and Trilitech, they employed dedicated arts leads, funded exhibitions at Art Basel and major museums, and put real grant support behind that community. It would be unfair not to credit that support.

Still, a grassroots digital art movement cannot by itself carry the infrastructure economics of a Layer 1 blockchain ($71 in 24-hour L1 fees; $365/day 30-day average) when independent infrastructure companies across the rest of the stack have been steadily pushed out or replaced in-house.

When community members ask on this forum why leadership has not shared a transparent ecosystem roadmap, in my view the issue is not the absence of a strategy; it is that the effective trajectory visible across these public filings, governance votes, and repository changes would be difficult to defend plainly to XTZ token holders:

  • Tezos L1 protocol development winding down toward minimal maintenance;
  • Independent ecosystem companies giving way to a single consolidated corporate group (Digital Commonwealth Foundation → Trilitech Limited → Nomadic Labs SAS) backed by tens of millions of dollars a year in unitemized Foundation payouts;
  • Public accountability surfaces (Biannual Report core-entity tables, linear.app/tezos, proto-ecosystem calls, Slack, and now day-to-day development on gitlab.com/tezos/tezos in #7242) closing one after another; and
  • Strategic focus shifting toward commercial ventures generating corporate “traction and revenue” inside the house group (£32.43M operating revenue and £2.20M net profit after tax at Trilitech in 2025), while XTZ holders, bakers, and artists hold a token whose entire circulating market cap ($228.5M) now sits at less than half of the $530M Foundation treasury originally raised to build an open, decentralized Tezos ecosystem.
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