I personally like the Quebec B proposal, what we can see right now is that users still prefer to delegate. We need to increase incentive to stake and QB sounds like a good way to do it.
A possible idea is also to make it easier to stake&unstake. For example: We could ditch the “finalize unstake” and reduce the unstake period by one cycle.
Hi,
I would suggest taking a step back from conspiracy theories. I am one of the individuals working on an alternative proposal, and I can assure you that the Paris issuance was not adjusted because of us.
Regarding the reduction of issuance, as I mentioned in my previous response, there are simpler ways to achieve this without adding unnecessary complexity. Anyway at this stage, lowering issuance will not improve Tezos’ economic performance. Why would it? The few individuals who are concerned about this issue might be alienated because of the constant changes. We’re on the verge of destabilizing our market actions simply because there’s no clear direction. No one knows what we’ll be voting on in the next three months, or if issuance is going to increase, decrease, or fluctuate unpredictably.
Anyway, if the goal is to reduce inflation, it’s as simple as adjusting one of the relevant figures. There’s no need to introduce yet another curve.
It is publicly known that the expectations for issuance reductions were scaled back in Paris, from the issuance max. ~5% proposed in Oxford to 10%, in order to appease a group of large bakers and secure their vote.
However, it appears that your proposal seeks to represent the interests of ‘several bakers,’ specifically those who have publicly opposed this new proposal in Quebec, as can be inferred from the following tweet:
As I mentioned earlier, the original direction in Oxford 1 was already clear. It seems the current effort in Quebec seeks to return to that path, given that the growth rate of staking has stagnated after the initial surge, and there is no evidence that the large bakers who haven’t staked yet will do so after all this time—especially now, when staking could contribute to a decrease in global issuance, and therefore, their own rewards
There is evidence that large bakers are enabling staking.
In my opinion, the fact that this particular baker plans to start staking next week is probably not significant, given the slowdown in the current staking rate. This rate could even decrease in the near future if the token price rises slightly and some stakers seek liquidity to sell.
Furthermore, it’s unlikely that this baker would stake due to the current issuance incentives, as it voted in favor of the lower incentives set in Oxford 1 and would likely also stake according to the incentives proposed in Quebec as well.
What? No. This was a technical decision based on the incentives for adopting stakers. With a 5% max, the new system would have started at the top. Shifting to 10% allowed for starting in the middle, allowing for incentives to grow – and, as it is the case now, provide better incentives for early adopters.
There were comments/feedback/suggestions from different bakers, large and smaller, as they always are, but this is the whole point of governance. Let’s not make conspiracies where there aren’t.
Why would stakers and delegators funds be treated the same? Rewards should be aligned with skin in the game/risks/investment: baker rewards > staker rewards > delegator rewards.
I’m not suggesting that the technical team engaged in covert communication to negotiate a higher emissions agreement with certain large bakers, nor that there is a baker cartel aiming to boycott the projected issuance reduction.
What I am arguing is that, based on my own inferences from publicly available and specific facts that I have already presented, the adjustment from Oxford1 to Paris was made due to the negative vote from those major bakers on Oxford1. Therefore, for the Paris proposal, the feedback these bakers had expressed in public forums was taken into account, with the intention of seeking an indirect consensus that would ensure a less ambitious option for emissions reduction would be favorably voted on. In fact, this approach has already been clearly observed in the reformulation of Quebec’s maximum emissions curve, which was initially more ambitious but was revised after one of that large bakers intervened in this thread against this proposal.
In summary, I don’t see this as a criticism but rather as a chronicle of public and evident facts. My arguments for or against have already been presented previously, and in any case, I am speaking exclusively on my own behalf.
It would improve Tezos’s economic performance because issuance creates sell pressure. The largest bakers are professional operations active in several ecosystems that don’t care two licks about holding Tezos (that’s not a dig, they are providing a good service and are holding XTZ in order to be able to bake at all). They sell their baking rewards instantly to fund their operations.
The Quebec A and B protocol proposal variants are ready to be submitted to the onchain governance process. See more details in our recent blog post:
If they wish, bakers can use https://gov.tez.capital to inject the proposals.
Which bakeries are you talking about? as far as I know, large bakers do exactly the opposite, they accumulate tokens at their addresses and do not sell in large batches
If you demand precision in arguments that oppose your own, wouldn’t it be logical for you to apply the same level of precision to your own arguments?
Can you confidently assert that large exchanges do not sell a portion of the rewards from the XTZ deposited with them? So far, only Kraken has engaged in staking and offered users returns both for delegation and staking. Can the same be said for some of the large bakers, especially those who have not yet engaged in staking and are opposed to reducing emissions, even though this might indirectly impact the action price?
I was thinking of Everstake and POSDog in particular when I said that.
This is projection dude. You made a factual assertion, he ask that you show some evidence that it is so. To counter he did make a factual assertion and should also back it. It does not absolve you on your part.
TzC has proposed the Qena proposal to go head-to-head with Quebec A/B. The Qena proposal doesn’t touch Adaptive Issuance and keeps the other tech advancements of Quebec.
Read more about Qena here: Qena Protocol Proposal: A Response to Quebec’s Adaptive Issuance Change | by Tez Capital | Sep, 2024 | Medium
I can repeat my question again. Name specific names of large bakers who have sold their baking rewards all time. You sum it up and present it as if all big bakeries sell all the prizes all the time. I, in turn, checked most of them and they all do not sell, but on the contrary, accumulate. So, what other arguments do you have besides this?
Excuse me, your argue was with @Swarles, I just asked you to specify your data as you were asking the same to him.
He already specified two large bakers: Posdog and Everstake.
I have been in the Posdog telegram and he assured many times, in the time I was active on there, that he used to do so.
Also, since you requested evidence of large bakers selling rewards, I am attaching a comprehensive report for your information:
I think he has his right to do so and I don’t like to point anyone, just answering you.
I have a (very strong) preference for Quebec over Qena, but I have to say it’s great to see a community insertion giving a real fight to a proposal inserted by Nomadic Labs. Well done!
Here is more information about Qena
https://tezcapital.medium.com/q-protocol-voting-in-context-9e3d399a735c
