Feedback Request: a new complementary maximal bound issuance for the Quebec protocol proposal

Research and Development
44

Good changes based on all of the feedback. I like Quebec B. :slight_smile:

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45

Great stuff! Listening to community feedback, adjusting and providing valuable information and different options for us :blush: Nice work :heart: I’m also team QB :wink:

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46

Thank you for taking all feedback into account and for explaining the security reasons for the limit of staking over baking.

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47

It’s great that there’s a vote and multiple options. In the end, we can always change the curve again (in R, S, so on and so forth) and I imagine we would given how early we are in this new model, and perhaps for reasons we can’t even necessarily foresee at this point.

For those that have expressed a desire for an option that includes no change to the Adaptive Maximum whatsoever, there’s nothing stopping you from injecting your own ‘Quebec-C’, ‘Quebec-D’ whatever.

As always with the benefits of on-chain governance, however the vote turns out:

  • If it turns out to be the right move then that’s great, good for us!
  • if it turns out to be the wrong move then we’ll be collectively better off for the experience, and the next time that someone wants to go in that direction (whatever the direction on which we land) we can say “we tried that before, and it didn’t work out”

I’ll just add this:

The one thing I hope we can all remember is that even if the inflation rate is high—because people aren’t adding to staking fast enough—that should be OUR (inside the community) added incentive and sense of urgency to get more people aware and staking. By lowering the inflation rate, we’re also lowering our own sense of urgency. There’s a reason why we add weights in resistance training (i say we, but I mean…gym people who do…Rocky and all that)—it tones our muscles and lets us adapt. We don’t say “this hurts, let’s reduce the weights.”

UNLESS it’s so bad that it will be irreparably hurting ourselves. So in the spirit of compromise, and to ease the nerves of many in the community we can presume that things are slightly too high now—that if we continue with this for another 6 months we’ll have stagflation—we’ll tear our muscles and be out of commission if we don’t taper down a little.

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48

Well, there are some barriers :slightly_smiling_face:

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49

Indeed, one needs to be very skilled, careful and considerate when attempting to craft and inject a proposal modification. There is a deep dark forest of considerations which need to be taken into account, if one wants to put forward a sound proposal that is meant to seriously go on mainnet.

We at Tez Capital are happily working on slowly and methodically discovering all the proposal crafting minutia, from the perspective of a non-core dev entity. Perhaps over time this will snowball into some documented best practices from our end and some kind of tool available for people to modify their own proposals using said best practices. One possible application of this tool would be for the community to do their own cafeteria style proposal funding in the very long term future.

Anyway, I like the energy but just wanna make sure we’re casting this in the right context and expectations.

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50

One does not need the core teams to make a desired variant of a proposal for it to be made manifest and realized. That would defeat the purpose of Tezos.

Independently made amendments can certainly win as well. I can tell you as someone who conceived amended proposals twice, independently sourced developers, without any sponsorship, both times having only injected them after most the voting period had already passed, retail campaigning for them, and having had them both become the two closest proposal votes in Tezos history, both within a single digit margin of winning…it is very much in reach.

51

So evidence says no community proposal passed so far. And even if there was a chance it was a long time ago. Anyway can you share hashes of these 2 proposals you conceived?

Nvm already found them. Thanks :slightly_smiling_face:

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52

This must be a lot of work, so I apologize for asking, but would it be possible to propose two more options, Quebec C and D, corresponding to A and B respectively, but without any changes to the adaptive maximum curve?

Personally, I’m satisfied with Quebec B (and even with A if B doesn’t make it through), but when I see the discussions regarding that curve, both here and on social networks, I think these options would be necessary to alleviate concerns and ensure a clear consensus at the end.

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53

Hey guys, thank you for your work. I am very glad that you listen to the opinions of the community members and do not rush to make categorical decisions that can be both useful and negative. I think that we need much more time to evaluate and re-evaluate what we have come to now. In any case, everything that is done is done for the better (this is a saying, by the way :)) My message to everyone here is - let’s not rush anywhere, but rationally and carefully analyze and benefit from what we have. We need to look at the current situation with a positive outlook and use this as an advantage over other chains.

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54

This is the best idea.

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55

Yes, @Boulange, we’re looking into that.

Please cast your vote:

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56

how about reducing the cycle time? or at least bring it to an even value for convenient calculation, for example 1 day or 2 days?

57

Our proposals are in the final stages, and we’ll be sharing the announcement soon.
In the meantime, thank you for the feedback you’ve already shared! We’re reviewing all your input and will respond to any outstanding questions shortly. Keep those questions and comments coming!

6 Likes
58

Just my 50 cents on the reduction for delegators, which might not be on the radar for many:

Currently, most DeFi contracts which do lock-in XTZ, eg liquidity pools on youves, do include the possibility to delegate these XTZ. This is important for the liquidity providers, otherwise they will loose XTZ rewards when they provide liquidity (and will simply stop doing that). The Paris upgrade already had a massive impact and made all pools which lock-in XTZ as liquidity a lot less attractive for liquidity providers.

There are potential solutions around this, but currently they do not exist and will need time to be developed. Also the DeFi platforms which do have XTZ liquidity will need time to adapt, replace contracts etc. Therefor I would urge not to reduce delegation rewards too fast. It can still be done once there are ways around.

4 Likes
59

What would be the desired outcome of reducing the cycle length? Is this just about convenience of getting closer to wall-clock time units, i.e reducing from ~2.4 days to say 2?

Note that I say closer, because the length of the cycle is, should, and will always be determined by block levels. It’s the only true unit of time in a blockchain – ok that is a quite personal, opinionated take :slight_smile:

As for reducing further the length of cycles, it depends on what you think we would win with it? Operationally, there are several tasks that happen on-chain (and off-chain for tooling like e.g. indexers) that are trigger by cycle ends and dawns. As a result, these periods are usually the hotter ones for network health. So this would be a trade-off in performance.

60

I don’t think a good place to start is reducing delegator rewards by 33%.I think delegators and stakers should equal in choice

61

Several bakers have expressed the desire to leave Adaptive Issuance and delegator power alone for now, giving the former more time to express itself.

Another reason provided was the possibility we will need the Paris curve back with its wider issuance band, should TezosX succeed in migrating all major dapps and services to a high speed L2 universal rollup.

While I personally think a lower target and a lower issuance curve are reasonable, I’ve been convinced that giving more time to the current incarnation of Adaptive Issuance is a good idea. If for no other reason, to provide early adopters with an edge over those bakers who do not participate in external staking.

The Qena proposal will be injected shortly after the official announcement/release of Quebec A and Quebec B. The Qena protocol will include all tech improvements, including the 8 second block times but it will leave out all Adaptive Issuance and delegator power related changes.

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62

To conclude my contribution to this thread, I would also like to make a case in favor of the initial objectives of adaptive issuance: reducing token issuance and thus inflation (in a modular way and in line with network participation, but ultimately lowering it).

I recall that in Paris, expectations for issuance reduction were already scaled back to appease a group of large bakers whose profits in Tezos are driven by the volume of rewards at selling price, rather than the potential appreciation of the token as a store of value.

I now ask these same bakers, who hold the voting power of everyone, to consider the interests of both small and large holders, especially now that it has been shown that the staking rate is not as expected and the protocol must be adjusted to achieve the initial and most important goal: lowering the issuance rate to improve Tezos’ composability and economic behaivor.

If the technical team has deemed it safe to reduce the inflation rate, then it is safe to do so—especially considering that the maximum issuance was previously doubled from ~5% to 10% to accommodate those same bakers, who are now attempting to block this corrective proposal once again.

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63

I like this more, slower but more solid approach, not against future changes for AI, but I also agree on giving more time to the current system to develop and gives us the opportunity to gather more Data.

1 Like