Heads Up: Enshrined Liquid Staking On Tezos

I probably should have mentioned that I’m not seriously proposing liquid baking! I said that to underline that it makes not sense. IMO we have a “you can’t have your cake and eat it” situation here. Either you stake and get higher rewards for freezing your funds and help secure the network or stay liquid and use your funds elsewhere. As far as i understood this was an economical idea that should balances liquid and frozen funds which would lead to less liquid funds, scarcity and ideally higher valuation. Well we all wait for higher valuation.

What bothers me most is that this proposal seems very spontaneous and random and we hear about it just now shortly before it’s supposed to be injected.

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Oh, this isn’t random—it’s a reruns marathon. Check the Feedback request: 4-hour cycles in upcoming proposal ; it’s the same old ‘we need 50%’ obsession in a different outfit. Since the ‘Q’ plan flopped, we’re back to our favorite hobby: sneaking economic ‘tweaks’ past the bakers and hoping they don’t notice we’re recycling the same failures from last time. It’s giving ‘desperate and out of ideas.’ Who needs actual economic logic when you can just keep throwing the same broken pasta at the wall?

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I think it’s better to not do the sTEZ token at all, but instead do something more interesting like the following (Just some raw ideas):

The user just stakes their native XTZ and the first cycle just earns the same as a delegator, but every cycle the APR increases rewarding the stakers for holding it for longer (the upper APR is discussable).
When the user decides to unstake, they should be able to (in case of personal emergency or something else).
If the user decides to unstake in a shorter time than 4 cycles for example, the user loses a portion of the stake instead of getting rewarded. The lost stake could be rewarded to the baker and other stakers (or burned, making XTZ somewhat deflationary in case it happens often).

Or the following:

The user can give away ownership of their stake (or a portion of it) to another address just like a contract can set an operator for a FA2 token so that the other address is the new staker. As the stake is more valuable than just having the XTZ (because it is monetized and earning), more people will be staking their XTZ, while being able to trade their stake with someone else (or third-party initiatives like stacy.fi) for the token they want or just XTZ.
This also creates opportunities for developers and dapps. We at dapp.storry.tv can for example let users give earning opportunities or of our own STV token in exchange for their stake without them having to unstake at all.
More native XTZ staked, means higher market value overtime as less XTZ will be sold in general.

———-

I think personally it’s not a good idea if the protocol is going to issue tokens which represent the native token inside that same protocol.

Also, is it the intent to lock the XTZ in a baker contract/address giving one giant baker the responsibility with all those XTZ?

– edit –
I see this part answered my last question, so bakers would be able to allocate capacity to it (That’s interesting):

Bakers participate by registering with the enshrined liquid staking contract and setting two parameters:

  • A ratio defining how much capacity they reserve for direct stakers versus enshrined liquid staking.

  • A fee applied to rewards generated by enshrined liquid stake allocated to them.

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Thanks everyone for the questions and feedback. Let me try to clarify a few aspects of the design and the intent behind it.

First, on the purpose of enshrined liquid staking.

The goal is not to replace direct staking, which remains the reference model for securing the network. The motivation is to provide a protocol-native alternative to third-party liquid staking intermediaries. Liquid staking markets tend to concentrate around the most liquid token over time, which can lead to large intermediaries controlling significant portions of stake. The idea behind an enshrined design is to provide a neutral protocol primitive so that this functionality does not depend on a small number of operators.

More broadly, the intent is to increase the amount of economically secured stake participating in consensus while still allowing some flexibility for users who need liquidity.

Second, on the comment that this looks like delegation with a different name.

It is actually different in an important way. Delegation increases both consensus power and governance voting power without adding economic security. Enshrined liquid staking instead increases the amount of economically secured stake participating in consensus, while not increasing governance voting power. Governance voting power remains tied to validators’ direct stake (own and external) outside of the liquid staking system.

Third, on slashing and validator risk.

Liquid staking does not remove validator risk. If a slashing event occurs, the associated loss is reflected directly in the exchange rate between the liquid token and tez. In practice, this means the loss is shared proportionally across the system through a small adjustment of the exchange rate, keeping the system simple and transparent.

Fourth, on why everyone would not simply switch to liquid staking.

The design includes global caps on the total liquid stake and allocation caps per validator. These limits ensure that enshrined liquid staking remains a portion of the overall stake rather than replacing direct staking or application-level liquid staking solutions such as Stacy, and they prevent concentration of stake on a single validator.

Validators participating in the system also declare fees and capacity, and stake is allocated algorithmically while respecting those constraints.

Finally, on the point that this proposal might feel sudden.

The intent of these heads-up posts is precisely to surface ideas early and gather reactions before a proposal is finalized. There are still aspects we expect to refine during the lifetime of proposal U, especially around allocation parameters and stake distribution functions, as we gather feedback and results from simulations and testnets.

We will share more detailed mechanics and parameters as the design is refined and also address some of the specific questions already raised here.

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I think this is unnecessary, why complicate things? It would be easier to record the capacity of the liquid stake and fees in the protocol, and this will be enough for everything to work well and attract attention for participation.

It seems strange that a baker would set the desired fee percentage for liquid staking, since liquid staking should be a common pool that should be distributed among all bakers participating in liquid staking according to their power and free capacity.

I also ask you to remove responsibility from the stakers for the incorrect actions of the bakers, because this does not seem logical.

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I don’t think staking in Tezos itself has a positive impact on the price of XTZ. Anyone can sell their coins, but only after a four-day waiting period. By comparison, on the Tron network, abandoning TRX staking may be disadvantageous for users of the network, as they will have to pay high transaction fees.

Staking is good because rewards are awarded by the protocol, but I don’t like the idea of ​​staking being held accountable for the baker’s misconduct.

It would be a good idea to abolish delegation. For those who currently delegate, there’s an alternative: depositing XTZ on Superlend.

What do you mean by secure the network?
Those who will stake XTZ in exchange for sTEZ are essentially strengthening the network’s security, as the XTZ will essentially be frozen, and they will only have a token that grants the right to claim the frozen XTZ.

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Majority can still do what it wants.

That’s true, we need a dictator with veto power that no one voted for. I’d like to propose a rock paper scissors tournament as a non-violent option. Who needs decentralization anyways.

That’s true, we need a dictator with veto power that no one voted for. I’d like to propose a rock paper scissors tournament as a non-violent option. Who needs decentralization anyways.

Decentralization thrives in simplicity, not theater. Made-up registries that nobody is required to follow provide nothing but “theatrical legitimacy.” They lure people into a false sense of safety while offering zero actual protection.

These structures add layers of red tape that don’t actually govern anything. They hurt the ecosystem by pretending to be an improvement without improving anything. If a system requires a fake registry to feel valid, it has already failed as a decentralized project. It is just a bureaucracy in a new costume.

Ironic that you managed convince enough stake holders to block proposals on multiple occasions yet you also claim that it’s theatrical.

Ironic that you managed convince enough stake holders to block proposals on multiple occasions yet you also claim that it’s theatrical.

I am pointing out that your proposal is purely theatrical. The current state of governance is fine from a technical perspective.

It’s not theatrical. It’s on chain proof that anyone can verify that the proposal was communicated ahead of time.

It is theatrical and useless if you need an another in protocol step for it to work properly. We can do the same just as well off protocol :slightly_smiling_face:

The concept is sound. Decentralizing liquid staking away from single intermediaries is a real security goal, and making it governance-neutral (no voting power from liquid stake) is the right call. But after reviewing both the Agora post and the actual implementation in GitLab, several things stand out.

1. The implementation is further along than this thread suggests.

The CLST (Canonical Liquid Staking Token) has been under active development in proto_alpha since at least February 6. Delegate parameter modules (Clst_delegates_parameters_repr), registered delegate storage, baker registration and parameter update logic, FA2.1-compliant token entrypoints (export/import tickets via export_ticket and import_ticket), ticket balance RPCs, and tests. Multiple NL engineers have been committing through February and March, with batches merged to master on March 3 and March 9.

The “heads up” post went live on March 6. A month of active implementation preceded the community’s first look at this feature.

This means key design decisions have already been made. Baker registration works a certain way. Token transfers work a certain way. The ticket mechanics are built. These choices encode economic assumptions that the community hasn’t seen, discussed, or validated.

2. The economics are still a black box.

The code shows bakers register with parameters (fee, capacity ratio) via register_delegate and can update them via update_delegate_parameters. What the code doesn’t answer, and what the Agora post leaves as “work in progress”:

  • What are the bounds? The Baker Fee Maximum, Baker Allocation Maximum, and Global Allocation Maximum are undefined. These are the guardrails that determine whether this system is sustainable or a race to the bottom on fees.
  • How does the protocol distribute stake across registered bakers? The allocation algorithm is the single most important economic variable in this design. Is it proportional to capacity? Weighted by fee? Round-robin? This isn’t a minor detail. It determines equilibrium baker economics.
  • No economic modeling has been shared. No simulation data. No sensitivity analysis. A feature that reshapes staking dynamics across the entire network should come with numbers, not just architecture.

3. Slashing socialization is confirmed and needs parameters.

zaynah confirmed in this thread that slashing losses are socialized across all sTEZ holders via exchange rate adjustment: “the loss is shared proportionally across the system through a small adjustment of the exchange rate.” The eligibility gate (clean slashing history) reduces probability, but an eligible baker can misbehave after registration. Responsible bakers’ stakers subsidize the losses caused by irresponsible ones.

The slashing history lookback window and severity curve are not specified. These define the risk profile of holding sTEZ and need to be published before anyone can make an informed evaluation.

4. The ecosystem impact deserves honesty, not framing.

Stacy (stXTZ) is live on L1 and Etherlink. Youves is the largest DeFi protocol on Tezos by TVL. Both are actively building and growing. Saying enshrined liquid staking is designed to “complement, not compete” doesn’t hold up when you’re offering the same core service with zero counterparty risk and protocol-level trust. That is a structural advantage no third-party project can match.

If the protocol is going to compete with its own ecosystem, say so plainly and explain why the security benefit outweighs the ecosystem cost.

5. Process.

Features with this level of economic impact need to be socialized before they’re built, not after. The two-phase rollout (feature-flagged in U, activated in V) is responsible engineering, and the testnet-first approach is the right way to validate. But the community should be evaluating the design alongside the development, not reviewing a finished implementation presented as an open question.


If Tezos is going to keep pointing to on-chain governance as its defining advantage over every other chain, then the governance process needs to actually produce the work product that justifies that claim. That means economic models published before code is merged. That means parameter discussions happening in public, not in MR comments. That means the community evaluating tradeoffs with real data, not reviewing finished implementations wrapped in the language of open questions. We’ve done 20+ upgrades with zero hard forks. That’s the flex. But the flex only holds if the process is real, and right now, the process is trailing the code.

I don’t think anyone is asking for Cardano-level work product, just something thoughtful enough that bakers and stakers can evaluate what they’re voting on before the code is already written. A one-pager with the proposed parameter ranges, a basic sensitivity analysis, and the allocation logic. And it’s not just about transparency for the community. The process of actually modeling these things forces you to stress-test your own assumptions. Engineers and architects regularly reconsider their approach when they sit down and run the numbers. That’s not overhead, that’s how you catch bad design decisions before they hit mainnet.

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Thanks for the review.

A few clarifications on process and status.

First, regarding the implementation timeline. What is currently in the codebase should be understood as the protocol primitives and infrastructure needed to support the mechanism (token representation, registration mechanics, ticket plumbing, etc.). These components need to be implemented early so they can be exercised on testnets and iterated on. The economic parameters and allocation behavior are intentionally not finalized yet, first implementation will be naive in order to test and refine behaviors during U lifetime.

Second, on the economics and parameters. You’re right that the key elements here are the allocation logic and parameter bounds (global caps, per-baker caps, fee limits, slashing eligibility windows, etc.). These are exactly the pieces we expect to refine over the lifetime of proposal U before any activation. We are currently working on publishing a more detailed document that describes the design, the allocation approach, and the intended parameter space (or this last point can come separately).

Third, on slashing risk. Socializing losses through the exchange rate is indeed the accounting model used here, but eligibility filters and allocation caps are intended to bound that risk and prevent excessive exposure to any single validator. This is one of the areas where simulations and testnets will be particularly important.

Finally, on process. The intention behind introducing the feature behind a flag in U and activating later in V is precisely to separate implementation from activation, giving the community time to evaluate the design, run experiments on testnets, and iterate on parameters before anything becomes live.

The goal of this heads-up is exactly what is happening here: to start that discussion early enough that the design can still evolve based on feedback.

More detailed documentation on the mechanics and parameter space should be available shortly, which should help answer several of the questions you raised.

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Thanks @zaynah for these explanations. I am a baker with average technical understanding, not an engineer. With these explanation the process starts to become more understandable than the original heads-up post! Why did these explanations needed turmoil and discussion? The heads-up post came on as an informative fact that Core Devs plan a sudden change in economics which several participants in the community felt like a quite ignorant move towards the community.

Please involve the community early in a way the community is really involved rather then just informed. Communicate the ideation and process. As @Primate411 wrote in the thread about shortening the governance cycle. Communication needs to reach the community! Before that we can’t discuss shortening the governance cycle.

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Thanks zaynah. Appreciate the clarity and the commitment to publishing the design document and parameter space.

Two quick follow-ups:

  1. Can you give a rough timeline on when that documentation will be available? “Shortly” means different things to different people. If it lands before the U injection discussion, the community has time to evaluate. If it lands after, we’re back to the same pattern.

  2. On the ecosystem question: the thread raised a direct concern about how enshrined liquid staking interacts with Stacy/Youves. That one went unanswered. Even a brief position on how you see protocol-level liquid staking coexisting with existing ecosystem projects would go a long way.

The feature-flag approach is the right engineering call and I want to acknowledge that. Getting the documentation and modeling out early is what turns that into the right governance call too.

One broader thought on the dynamic here.

The community raises concerns. NL responds with reassurances. The community asks for specifics. NL commits to publishing something “shortly.” This has been the pattern for several cycles now.

I want to be careful about how I say this, but the tone of these exchanges sometimes feels less like a discussion between equals and more like a parent reassuring a child that they’ll understand when they’re older. “The parameters will come.” “Trust the process.” “We’ll share more soon.”

Bakers aren’t asking to be reassured. We’re asking to be included in the design phase, not the review phase. There’s a difference between “here’s what we built, what do you think?” and “here’s what we’re considering building, what should we account for?” The first is a presentation. The second is collaboration.

The fact that primitives are being implemented and merged before the economic design is even documented tells us where the community sits in the decision chain. We’re downstream of the code. That’s the structural issue, and no amount of polished heads-up posts changes it until the sequence changes.

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You’re spot on! I still haven’t gotten an answer to my question, and what I’ve proposed.

It is impossible to have a discussion if their point of view on the concept of liquid staking is not fully understood.

Personally, I don’t think there’s a need to register a baker in liquid staking with the “fee” and “capacity ratio” parameters. It’s an unnecessary complication.
These parameters should be fixed in the protocol, and I’d like to hear why they think these parameters need to be set by the baker.

Liquid staking will be a shared pool, and therefore participating bakers should have the same parameters. Each baker shouldn’t have to set their own parameters; that’s illogical, confusing, and overly complicated.

THIS.

It doesn’t matter how good your ideas are, they’re always your ideas and not our ideas. The solve is simple. Talk to us FIRST, not LAST

The reason bakers declare parameters such as fee and capacity rather than having them fixed globally in the protocol is mainly to allow competition and flexibility.

If those parameters were fixed at the protocol level, every baker would participate under identical conditions and the protocol would effectively be choosing a single economic configuration for everyone. Allowing bakers to declare parameters lets the system adapt more dynamically: bakers can signal the conditions under which they are willing to participate, and the protocol allocates liquid stake while respecting those constraints.

In practice this introduces a form of competition (for example on fees), rather than locking the system into a single protocol-defined setting.

At the same time, the protocol still enforces global guardrails such as caps and eligibility conditions to prevent excessive concentration or instability.

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